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1161 
SAMPLING THE CIRCUITS: THE CASE FOR  
A NEW COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME FOR 
DETERMINING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT  
AS A RESULT OF MUSIC SAMPLING 
INTRODUCTION 
Music sampling continues to be the linchpin of a variety of musical 
styles including rap, hip-hop, house, and dance music, and has even 
become prevalent in rock music.
1
 The practice of sampling involves taking 
pre-existing sound recordings and using portions of those recordings as 
elements in a new musical composition.
2
 The amount of the work sampled 
can range from taking the entire ―hook‖ or chorus/refrain from a musical 
composition to smaller elements, such as a riff or even one or two notes or 
words.
3
  
Music sampling, as it pertains to copyright law and copyright licensing, 
is a real and current issue. As recently as November 3, 2010, the United 
States Copyright Office began taking comments, at the direction of 
Congress, as to whether copyright protection should be extended to pre-
1972 sound recordings.
4
 Among the peripheral issues implicated by this 
potential extension was how such an extension might affect sampling of 
pre-1972 recordings.
5
 Moreover, one example that perfectly illustrates the 
 
 
1. KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE 1 (2011). 
2. Id. (describing sampling as a ―technique that incorporates portions of existing sound 
recordings into a newly collaged composition‖); JOSEPH G. SCHLOSS, MAKING BEATS: THE ART OF 
SAMPLE-BASED HIP-HOP 150 (2004) (―Sampling allows producers to take musical performances from 
a variety of recorded contexts and organize them into a new relationship with each other. It is this 
relationship that represents the producers‘ art [] and . . . reveals the producers‘ aesthetic goals.‖). 
3. See generally SCHLOSS, supra note 2, at 79–100 (discussing selection of source materials for 
samples in the hip-hop genre). 
4. Federal Copyright Protection of Sound Recordings Fixed Before February 15, 1972, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 67,777 (Nov. 3, 2010); see also infra notes 100–03 (discussing of the current state of copyright 
protection for sound recordings). The Copyright Office ultimately issued a December 2011 report 
recommending that copyright protection should be extended to pre-1972 recordings. UNITED STATES 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS (2011), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/ (last visited May 14, 2012). 
5. Federal Copyright Protection of Sound Recordings Fixed Before February 15, 1972, 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 67,780. The Copyright office specifically asked for comments regarding the following 
questions: (1) ―[w]ould business arrangements concerning sampling of sound recordings be affected 
by bringing pre-1972 recordings under federal law; and if so, how would they be affected?‖; and (2) 
―[a]re pre-1972 sound recordings currently treated differently with respect to sampling?‖ Id. Notably, 
however, the answers to these questions were not specifically addressed in the Copyright Office‘s 
2011 report. 
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current implications of sampling on copyright law is what one 
commentator calls ―the Girl Talk dilemma,‖ referring to the mash-up artist 
Girl Talk.
6
 On November 15, 2010, Girl Talk made available downloads 
of his album All Day
7
 free of charge on the record label Illegal Art.
8
 This 
freely distributed album, which contains a high number of samples—none 
of which have been licensed—raises serious questions regarding the 
legality of this release. Upon first listen to the opening track, ―Oh No,‖9 I 
easily identified samples of Black Sabbath‘s ―War Pigs,‖10 Ludacris‘ 
―Move Bitch,‖11 Cali Swag District‘s ―Teach Me How to Dougie,‖12 
Jane‘s Addiction‘s ―Jane Says,‖13 the Ramones‘ ―Blitzkrieg Bop,‖14 and 
Missy Elliot‘s ―Get Ur Freak On,‖15 just to name a few.16 In light of 
current industry practices,
17
 it is hard to imagine how Girl Talk could 
release such a record without raising questions as to whether his uses of 
these samples constitutes copyright infringement
18
 or fair use.
19
 While this 
 
 
 
6. David Mongillo, The Girl Talk Dilemma: Can Copyright Law Accommodate New Forms of 
Sample-Based Music?, 9 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. POL‘Y 3 (2009). 
7. GIRL TALK, ALL DAY (Illegal Art 2010). 
8. See Girl Talk—All Day, ILLEGAL ART, http://illegal-art.net/allday/ (last visited May 12, 
2012). Girl Talk intimates on his website in statements regarding transformative fair use of his own 
work that the unlicensed samples contained on his record are a fair use of the underlying musical 
compositions and sound recording. The relevant statement explains 
All Day by Girl Talk is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 
license. The CC license does not interfere with the rights you have under the fair use 
doctrine, which gives you permission to make certain uses of the work even for commercial 
purposes. Also, the CC license does not grant rights to non-transformative use of the source 
material Girl Talk used to make the album. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
9. GIRL TALK, Oh No, on ALL DAY (Illegal Art 2010). 
 10. BLACK SABBATH, War Pigs/Luke’s Wall, on PARANOID (Vertigo 1970). 
 11. LUDACRIS FEATURING MYSTIKAL & I-20, Move Bitch, on WORD OF MOUF (Def Jam 2002). 
 12. CALI SWAG DISTRICT, Teach Me How to Dougie, on THE KICKBACK (Capitol 2010). 
 13. JANE‘S ADDICTION, Jane Says, on NOTHING‘S SHOCKING (Warner Brothers 1988). 
 14. RAMONES, Blitzkrieg Bop, on RAMONES (ABC 1976). 
 15. MISSY ELLIOTT, Get Ur Freak On, on MISS E . . . SO ADDICTIVE (Elektra 2001). 
 16. Girl Talk thanks each of the sampled artists and provides a list of all artists and songs that 
have been sampled on the record. Girl Talk—All Day Samples List, ILLEGAL ART, http://illegal-art.net/ 
allday/samples.html (last visited May 12, 2012). One fan has even gone as a far as to identify each 
sampled work in each song on Girl Talk‘s new release, synchronizing visual markers indicating which 
sample is being heard as the track plays. Girl Talk—All Day, ALLDAYSAMPLES.COM, http://allday 
samples.com (last visited May 12, 2012). 
 17. See infra Part I.C (discussing music licensing). 
 18. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing copyright infringement). 
 19. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing fair use); see also Mongillo, supra note 6, at 3. Mongillo 
notes that Girl Talk‘s previous album Feed Animals contained over 300 unlicensed samples. Id. 
Mongillo suggests that Girl Talk has yet to be sued for copyright infringement because record 
companies are concerned that such legal action might create precedent that would be unfavorable to 
them. Id. Further, Mongillo argues that fair use should be extended to sampling analogous to Girl 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/4
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is an extreme example of the use of sampling in contemporary music—as 
one commentator notes, Girl Talk‘s work adds virtually no original 
content to accompany the samples of other artists‘ work20—it clearly 
illustrates the point that copyright infringement by way of music sampling 
is a current issue. 
In its current state, copyright law and judicial interpretation of the same 
have been relatively hostile to samplers who fail to obtain licenses from 
the relevant copyright holders of musical compositions or sound 
recordings
21—both of which are protected as separate copyrights under 
Title 17 of the United States Code.
22
 Due to this hostility, the licensing and 
clearing of samples has become a major source of revenue for record 
companies and music publishers alike.
23
 For example, the famous record 
Paul’s Boutique by the Beastie Boys,24 which was comprised of nearly 95 
percent samples, required over $250,000 in licensing fees alone.
25
 More 
recently, Kanye West reportedly came very close to licensing a small 
sample from Lauryn Hill‘s MTV Unplugged record for over $150,000.26 
Unfortunately, in light of evidence suggesting that the financial viability of 
record companies has diminished significantly, these licensing agreements 
will likely continue to become more expensive due to an effort by record 
companies to generate sufficient revenue to remain viable business 
organizations.
27
 Due to legal uncertainty regarding the contours of what is 
 
 
Talk‘s practices. Id. This Note will challenge that proposition, ultimately concluding that stretching 
fair use doctrine as far as Mongillo suggests is not prudent. See infra notes 239–46 and accompanying 
text. 
 20. Accord Mongillo, supra note 6, at 2. Of course, this comment should not be construed as an 
indictment of the great skill and great deal of work necessary to create Girl Talk‘s mashups. Indeed, 
his arrangements would likely be protectable derivative works, provided he acquired the proper 
licenses for the samples. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (―A ‗derivative work‘ is a work based upon one 
or more preexisting works, such as . . . musical arrangement.‖); 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (―The subject 
matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes . . . derivative works.‖). However, any such 
protection ―extends only to the material contributed‖ by Girl Talk ―and does not imply an exclusive 
right in the preexisting material.‖ 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 21. See infra Part II.B (discussing cases involving copyright infringement claims, generally 
holding in favor of the plaintiff regardless of the objective standard used to determine infringement). 
 22. See infra notes 98, 99, 101 and accompanying text. 
 23. See, e.g., AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 1548–1549 (4th ed. 2010) 
(noting that flat fees to sample a master recording range from $2,500 to $20,000 and royalties often 
include advances starting at $5,000 with rates of 1/2¢ to 5¢ per unit). 
 24. THE BEASTIE BOYS, PAUL‘S BOUTIQUE (Capitol Records 1989). 
 25. KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 89 (2007). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See 2008 Consumer Profile, RIAA, http://76.74.24.142/CA052A55-9910-2DAC-925F-27663 
DCFFFF3.pdf (last visited May 12, 2012) (showing that sales have declined at an alarming rate, 
decreasing from approximately $14 billion in revenue in 1999 to approximately $8 billion in 2008). 
This is not to say, however, that the entertainment industry is not currently thriving. Indeed, one report 
shows, inter alia, that sales and marketing of music through untraditional channels (i.e., not through 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and what is not actionable infringement, by and large, in order to avoid 
litigation, artists are encouraged to either license even the smallest samples 
or refrain from sampling—one of musical artists‘ most creative tools—
altogether.
28
 
In light of the aforementioned issues, this Note suggests that in order to 
make copyright law conform to the constitutional purpose of copyright 
protection, promote creativity, and provide clarity for musical artists, a 
more robust paradigm for determining infringement as a result of sampling 
is needed. Part I of this Note provides a discussion of the history and 
industry practices regarding music sampling, describing how sampling 
works, the technology involved, and why sampling is valuable to musical 
artists. Part II lays out the general law that affects sampling. Part III 
examines the legal difficulties resulting from the way copyright law treats 
music sampling and the impact of this treatment on creativity. Finally, Part 
IV suggests a comprehensive scheme to balance the competing interests of 
samplers and copyright holders by creating realistic and appropriate 
protections for copyright holders, while still accommodating the creativity 
encouraged by the ―Copyright and Patent Clause‖ of the Constitution and 
embracing technology-based creativity involving the use of sampling. 
I. SAMPLING: THE RECORDING INDUSTRY, TECHNOLOGY, AND WHY 
MUSICIANS SAMPLE 
A. History 
At the outset, one might inquire, why sample? To understand why 
sampling is such a prevalent practice, it is necessary to briefly examine 
sampling‘s historical roots. Sampling is a derivative of deejaying.29 
 
 
major record companies) has been quite successful and profitable. See generally MICHAEL MASNICK & 
MICHAEL HO, THE SKY IS RISING: A DETAILED LOOK AT THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT 
INDUSTRY 23–29 (2012). This, of course, only further substantiates the claim that record companies 
will be looking for sampling revenues (either through licensing or litigation) in order to offset artists‘ 
use of these alternative channels rather than the traditional business models implemented by record 
companies. See id. at 29. Masnic and Ho explain that ―[i]n many cases, there seem to be significant 
barriers for musical startups, but the toughest barrier doesn‘t seem to be a lack of consumer demand or 
prohibitive costs for music production. It‘s more likely that major music labels will sue music startups 
out of existence.‖ Id. Although the claim that ―major music will sue music startups out of existence‖ 
may be over exaggerated given the data Masnic and Ho present regading profitability, no doubt 
litigation and licensing will be prevelant means by which record companies will attempt to remain 
viable. 
 28. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 23, at 1619. 
 29. SCHLOSS, supra note 2, at 31. Deejaying, as referenced here, generally involves the use of 
two turntables connected by a mixer, allowing the ―DJ‖ to switch from one record to another. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/4
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Deejays, of course, wanted to keep dancers on the dance floor; as such, 
they maintained a practice of playing only the pieces of songs that were 
popular with dancers and omitting the remainder of the song.
30
 In 
particular, the use of drumbeats, otherwise known as ―breaks,‖ was 
particularly prevalent.
31
  
In the 1980s, inventors, in an attempt to increase the capabilities of 
synthesizers, created the digital sampler—a device that ―allows the 
musician to record sounds from other instruments, nature, or even non-
musical sources, and transpose and play them chromatically on a standard 
piano or organ keyboard.‖32 Eventually, as digital samplers became more 
sophisticated,
33
 deejays began using digital samplers for unintended 
purposes, sampling not only drums and drumbeats from records, but 
sampling melodies and bass lines, among other things.
34
 Once these 
elements were sampled, the digital sampler could be played like an 
instrument. This implementation provided a much more sophisticated 
manner of producing music that was similar to the methodology deejays 
had previously produced using turntables.
35
 Furthermore, these new digital 
samplers allowed users to edit samples—whether they were presets or 
recorded material—and ―sequence‖ various samples to make entire 
musical arrangements.
36
  
Of course, it was not a far stretch for deejay-turned-producer types to 
incorporate this methodology into hip-hop music produced for mass 
distribution by record companies.
37
 Eventually, sample-based music 
moved from being a more efficient means of replicating live performances 
by deejays to a sophisticated form of studio-based music, often producing 
music that would be quite difficult to create by means of live 
instrumentation or in an improvisational setting such as deejaying at a 
party or club.
38
 For example, at its height in 1980—often referred to as the 
 
 
 30. Id. at 32. 
 31. Id. Often these drum beats came from records that would not traditionally be considered 
dance music and were often unpopular with the dance club audience.  
 32. Id. at 34–35. Schloss notes, the inclusion of the digital sampler was intended to be a novelty. 
Id. at 34. For a more in-depth discussion of sampling technology and recording technology more 
generally, see infra Part I.B. 
 33. An example of such a sampler is the Em-u SP-12, which was intended to be used as a drum 
machine and had sampling capabilities for the purposes of recording live drum samples. SCHLOSS, 
supra note 2, at 35. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. Marley Marl, a hip-hop producer from New York, is generally credited as the first person 
to make use of the digital sampler in this manner. Id. 
 38. Id. at 41–43. 
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golden age of hip-hop
39—artists such as Public Enemy and the Bomb 
Squad began producing hip-hop records, often characterized as ―sound 
collages,‖ which contained massive numbers of small samples and would 
have been nearly impossible to create with turntables alone.
40
 Of course, at 
the time, these artists were generally unaware of the legal consequences of 
their actions.
41
  
While it is unnecessary (and beyond the scope of this Note) to 
chronicle more recent developments in the art of sampling, it is sufficient 
to say that sampling has continued to be a prevalent practice and powerful 
tool in modern musical composition. However, in 1991, following the 
Southern District of New York‘s holding in Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. 
Warner Bros. Records
42
 that unlicensed use of a sample in a hip-hop 
recording constituted copyright infringement, copyright infringement by 
way of music sampling became a complication artists needed to consider.
43
 
While this may have reduced the quantity of samples included in newer 
music—due to the fact that using large quantities of samples has become 
economically unfeasible
44—sampling is still prevalent and relevant in 
current musical culture, as clearly shown by Girl Talk‘s most recent 
offering.
45
 
B. Making Music Using Samples: Recording, Technology, and Sampling 
As alluded to above, music technology is particularly important when 
addressing issues of music sampling, primarily because use of this 
technology supplies the means by which sampling is used as a creative 
tool in the creation of musical works. There are two basic forms of 
technology used for recording—analog and digital—both of which are 
viable methods of sampling.
46
 Analog recording is traditionally 
 
 
 39. Id. at 39. No doubt, this label in part is due to the fact that this era occurred prior to the legal 
turmoil experienced by many hip-hop artists as a result of lawsuits related to the unlicensed sampling 
of copyrighted material.  
 40. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 25, at 81. 
 41. Id. Chuck D, of Pubic Enemy has been often quoted as saying, ―[w]e just thought sampling 
was just a way of arranging sound. Just like a musician would take sounds of an instrument and 
arrange them in their own particular way. We actually thought we was quite crafty with it.‖ Id. 
 42. 780 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 43. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 25, at 85.  
 44. Id.; see also infra notes 86–91 (illustrating how the need to license samples, and cost of said 
licenses, has the effect of reducing the number of samples an artist can feasibly afford to use on a 
particular record). 
 45. See supra notes 7–20. 
 46. FRANCIS RUMSEY & TIM MCCORMICK, SOUND RECORDING: AN INTRODUCTION 162, 200 
(4th ed. 2004). As stated, both digital and analog methodologies are perfectly viable means for 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/4
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accomplished via two primary mediums: magnetic tape and vinyl.
47
 
Digital recordings are created by sampling the amplitude of a particular 
waveform at a particular frequency, which is then converted into binary 
code.
48
 These amplitudes are then reassembled to recreate the waveform of 
the original signal.
49
 Eventually, these formats are converted into digital 
media, such as a CD or an MP3, for mass consumption. 
Today, most recordings are digital and are created using a tool called 
Digital Audio Workstations (DAWs).
50
 DAWs are powerful recording and 
non-linear editing tools as they allow samplers to digitally import works 
they want to sample and easily edit, sequence, and mix those samples with 
other samples or newly recorded audio.
51
 Another popular means of 
sampling—perhaps even more popular in particular genres, such as hip-
hop—is the use of digital samplers such as the Akai MPC 2000 and related 
models, particularly in the context of hip-hop and contemporary R & B 
production.
52
 
The last topic of relevance to digital sampling in the recording industry 
is signal processing. Signal processing consists of processes that 
―manipulate a sound in various ways, often to make it sound different than 
the original source, or to bring out a particular characteristic in the 
 
 
creating samples; as such, legal scholars‘ reference to sampling as ―digital sampling‖ is inaccurate. 
MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 1, at 1. Examples of analog sampling include using multiple 
turntables (many deejays use this method) or cutting and splicing magnetic tape. Id.; see also THE 
BEATLES, Being for the Benefit of Mr. Kite!, on SGT. PEPPER‘S LONELY HEART CLUB BAND (Apple 
Records 1967) (using samples that were cut and spliced from a sound effects reel, reversed, and 
rerecorded as a backing track). In this light, this Note refers to the practice of what is commonly and 
inaccurately called ―digital sampling‖ as ―music sampling‖ in order to encompass analog sampling 
methodologies. However, the prevalence of sampling today seems to be attributable to the relative ease 
by which sampling can be accomplished though modern digital methodologies, such as Digital Audio 
Workstations (―DAWs‖) and digital samplers as discussed infra. 
 47. RUMSEY & MCCORMICK, supra note 46, at 200. In the case of magnetic tape, microphones 
convert changes in voltage into a pattern of varying magnetization, which can then be replayed using a 
tape machine. Alternatively, in the case of vinyl, recordings are made by a ―groove of varying 
deviation,‖ which represents the waveform and is played back using the stylus on a record player. Id. 
 48. Id. Typical sample rates range from 44100 Hz to upwards of 194000 Hz. Of course, the 
higher the rate of sampling and the greater the bit depth of these samples, the better the recording. Id. 
These types of records are then stored in a number of different mediums such as digital tape or hard 
drive. Id. at 227, 249.  
 49. See generally id. at 203–15. 
 50. Id. at 249. Examples of popular digital audio workstations are Avid‘s Pro Tools, Apple‘s 
Logic, and Steinberg‘s Nuendo. 
 51. ―‗You don‘t have to learn how to play guitar,‘ . . . . ‗You don‘t have to know nothing. All 
you have to do is get a sound editing program for your computer, and you‘re right there. You can make 
the next big record in the world.‘‖ MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 1, at 5 (quoting remix artist 
Steinski); see also RUMSEY & MCCORMICK, supra note 46, at 245–49 (discussing generally the 
benefits of non-linear editing accomplished via digital audio workstations). 
 52. SCHLOSS, supra note 2, at 30, 35. 
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source.‖53 These processes include compression/limiting,54 equalization,55 
reverberation and delay,
56
 modulation,
57
 pitch shifting and pitch 
correcting,
58
 and changes to the gain structure,
59
 to name some general 
 
 
 53. DANIEL M. THOMPSON, UNDERSTANDING AUDIO: GETTING THE MOST OUT OF YOUR 
PROJECT OR PROFESSIONAL RECORDING STUDIO 24 (2005); see also GARY DAVIS & RALPH JONES, 
THE SOUND REINFORCEMENT HANDBOOK 243 (2d ed. 1989) (―A signal processor is a device (or 
circuit) which alters the audio signal in some non-linear fashion.‖). Thompson explains signal 
processing in the analog domain—as in a traditional recording studio—noting that once sounds have 
been captured ―[t]he signals can then be processed using equalizers or ‗EQs‘ to adjust the tone or 
‗timbre,‘ compressors for dynamic level control and ‗punch,‘ noise gates to eliminate unwanted 
sounds.‖ THOMPSON, supra note 53, at 7. ―Just as processing operations like equalisation [sic], fading 
and compression can be performed on analogue [sic] sound signals, so they can on digital sound 
signals.‖ RUMSEY & MCCORMICK, supra note 46, at 217. ―Digital signal processing (DSP) involves 
the high speed manipulation of the binary data representing audio samples[] . . . [c]arried out by 
computing devices capable of performing fast mathematical operations on data . . . .‖ Id. 
 54. Compression or limiting (two species of the same process) ―control the swing in the level of 
a signal, reducing, for instance, the difference in signal level between the softest and loudest notes of a 
vocal performance.‖ THOMPSON, supra note 53, at 24; see also DAVIS & JONES, supra note 53, at 270. 
Even more so, compressors and limiters will be used in a more creative way to ―change the sound of 
the signal, adding ‗punch‘ or ‗tightness.‘‖ THOMPSON, supra note 53, at 24. 
 55. Equalizing and filtering (a common type of equalizing) are processes that alter the tone or 
timbre of a particular sound. See THOMPSON, supra note 53, at 7. Equalization refers to a process that 
boosts or cuts a particular range of frequencies. DAVIS & JONES, supra note 53, at 244. Filtering, on 
the other hand, typically refers to a process that cuts all frequencies that are above (low-pass filters) or 
below (high-pass filters) a particular frequency. Id. at 244, 256–58. 
 56. Reverberation is a naturally occurring phenomenon in indoor environments ―caused by 
reflection from walls, floor, ceiling and other surfaces which do not absorb all the sound‖ from a 
particular source. DAVIS & JONES, supra note 53, at 259. Devices such as reverb chambers, ducts, 
springs, and digital reverb devices and software can be used to emulate this phenomenon and add this 
effect to a ―dry‖ source. Id. at 261–66. Delay refers to an exact digital or analog copy of the source 
signal reproduced later in time, commonly referred to by the layman as ―echo.‖ Id. at 259, 266–69. 
 57. Modulation includes a number of processes including, but not limited to, flanging and 
phasing. Flanging is a sound ―described as swishing or tunneling‖ caused by two or more identical 
signals, heard simultaneously, where one of the signals is slightly delayed at varying times resulting in 
a phenomenon called comb filtering. Id. at 277. This effect derives its name from the analog 
methodology of creating the effect, accomplished by intermittently pressing on the flange of a tape 
reel. Id. Phasing occurs when a portion of a source signal is altered with one or more comb filters that 
change frequencies over time. Id. at 278. The resulting sound is similar, yet distinguishable, from 
flanging. Id. 
 58. Pitch shifting is a process by which an entire source or portions thereof can be transposed. 
Devices and software producing this effect accomplish it by slicing the audio file ―and then 
lengthening each section where the pitch is to be decreased, or shortening each section where the pitch 
is to be increased.‖ Paul White, Effects: All You Need to Know . . . And a Little Bit More, SOUND ON 
SOUND (May 2007), http://www.soundonsound.com/sos/may07/articles/effects.htm. Pitch correction 
processors such as Auto-Tune, on the other hand, ―monitor the pitch of the incoming signal, then 
compare it to a user-defined scale, which can be a simple chromatic scale or any combination of notes. 
Pitch-shifting techniques are then used to nudge the audio to the nearest semitone in the user‘s scale.‖ 
Id. ―The main creative application for pitch correction is the so-called ‗Cher effect,‘‖ which can be 
described as a ―robotic-sounding‖ vocal effect. Id. 
 59. Usually, altering the gain structure of a particular sound involves increases or decreases in 
the perceived volume of particular sounds. DAVIS & JONES, supra note 53, at 28. However, this can 
involve creating distortion—that is, a change in the signal that alters the amplitude or phase, or creates 
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categories. The use of such processes—often referred to as ―effects‖ by 
laypersons
60—is typical in the recording industry for the purposes of 
mixing.
61
 
Samplers, however, often use signal processing more dramatically to 
hide or transform samples—making them virtually unrecognizable—in 
order to avoid licensing copyrights and for creative reasons.
62
 This Note 
argues that such processes, although generally viewed by samplers and 
copyright holders as evading legal obligations under copyright law,
63
 
should not be viewed as such. Furthermore, these processes become 
important in the music-sampling context because they have the potential to 
be what this Note refers to as adequate ―transformative processes.‖ As 
argued, transformative processes, to some extent, would absolve samplers 
from obtaining licenses for those samples that are sufficiently 
transformed.
64
 Of course, under current copyright law, the issue raised by 
samples that are severely altered is whether unrecognizable or severely 
altered samples should constitute infringement or whether this 
transformation is sufficient to warrant a finding of fair use.
65
 
C. Sample Clearing: Licensing Samples 
To this point, the discussion regarding sampling has answered why 
artists sample and how sample-based music is created. Perhaps more 
relevant to legal discourse is, what happens once an artist samples, using 
another artist‘s work as source material. There are two basic scenarios: 
(a) the artist licenses the sample from the relevant copyright holders, or 
(b) they do not license the sample and hope they are not sued for 
 
 
different frequencies not perceived in the original signal. Id. at 81. Practically speaking, the term 
―distortion‖ in creative applications ―is more commonly used to describe processes that change the 
waveform in some radical and often level-dependent way.‖ White, supra note 58. Often, distortion 
may be undesirable; however, where distortion is intentional, it can be a powerful tool for altering 
audio. Common uses ―include guitar overdrive, fuzz, and simply overdriving analogue [sic] circuitry 
or tape to achieve ‗warmth‘.‖ Id. 
 60. DAVIS & JONES, supra note 53, at 243 (noting this common term and indicating a preference 
for the term signal processor ―because it covers [a] device in all cases, whether used for mild 
enhancement or extreme special effects‖). 
 61. THOMPSON, supra note 53, at 23 (describing the use of signal processing in the mixing 
process). 
 62. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 25, at 90. Artists such as Cypress Hill, a popular rap 
group, have noted that, when making beats, ―the trick is to really fuck [the sample] up so that you 
don‘t even have to ask for permission.‖ Id. 
 63. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 25, at 90. 
 64. See infra Part IV.B (discussing transformative processes). 
 65. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act). 
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infringement.
66
 Provided that the sampled work was fixed after February 
15, 1972,
67
 a sampler who chooses the former route must obtain a license 
from the holder of the copyright in the musical composition and the 
sampled sound recording.
68
 Adding to an already arduous task, these two 
copyrights are rarely owned by the same entities.
69
 
For licensing purposes, copyrights in sound recordings and copyrights 
in musical compositions are treated differently. Choosing to license a 
sound recording is exclusively at the discretion of the copyright holder.
70
 
Owners of musical compositions, however, do not enjoy complete 
exclusivity with regard to licensing. Under the Copyright Act, a sound 
recording is considered a derivative work of the underlying musical 
composition.
71
 In order to fix and distribute a sound recording of a musical 
work, a distributor must obtain a mechanical license from the owner of the 
copyright in the musical composition.
72
 Under 17 U.S.C. § 115, Congress 
has provided that once a recording of a non-dramatic musical composition 
has been distributed in the United States, the owner of the copyright in the 
musical composition is compelled to grant a license in the work to make 
and distribute the recordings of that work.
73
 While § 115 compels the 
 
 
 66. Kohn and Kohn note in their treatise on music licensing that although juries are often the 
final arbiter as to whether the sample is recognizable or whether an association between the original 
work and the sampled work can be made, the possibility remains that a court could find infringement 
where only an expert is capable of making such a distinction. As such, they strongly advise artists to 
obtain licenses, even if the sample is well hidden within the new work. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 23, 
at 1607. 
 67. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971), amended by Pub 
L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)) (providing for 
copyright protection for sound recordings created after February 15, 1972). 
 68. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 23, at 1598. 
 69. Id. at 1607. 
 70. Id. at 1608. 
 71. Id. For an in-depth discussion of copyright law and how the law affects samplers, see infra 
Part II. 
 72. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 23, at 732. The term ―mechanical license‖ derives from the term 
―mechanical reproductions,‖ which refers to any fixed form embodying a recording of music including 
piano rolls, music boxes, records, tapes, compact discs, and digital files. Id.  
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2006). The relevant language contained in § 115 is as follows: 
When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have been distributed to the public in the 
United States under the authority of the copyright owner, any other person, including those 
who make phonorecords or digital phonorecord deliveries, may, by complying with the 
provisions of this section, obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords of 
the work. . . .  
Id. Obtaining a mechanical license for the purpose of ―covering‖ a work that has already been sold 
commercially is a relatively streamlined process. Provided that (1) the work is a nondramatic musical 
work, (2) it has been previously recorded and distributed, (3) the new recording does not change the 
fundamental character of the work, and (4) is only used as a phonorecord, the owner of the copyright 
in the musical composition is compelled to license the musical composition. DONALD PASSMAN, ALL 
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owner of a musical composition to license the composition to any party 
who wishes to create a new sound recording of the work, there are 
limitations on this requirement. Under § 115(a)(2), a person who obtains a 
compulsory license is only permitted to alter the arrangement and not the 
―basic melody or fundamental character of the work.‖74 This provision has 
been interpreted to exclude samples from the compulsory licensing 
requirement.
75
  
The entire process of licensing samples is referred to in the music 
industry as clearing samples or sample clearance.
76
 Beginning in the early 
90s, following a slew of lawsuits regarding unlicensed samples,
77
 record 
labels instituted a policy requiring artists to complete a ―sample clearance 
report‖ where an artist divulges all of the samples used on a particular 
record.
78
 Once identified by the artist, the record label attempts to clear the 
samples—that is, it contacts the relevant copyright holders to get 
permission to use the sample and negotiate a licensing agreement.
79
 
Copyright holders of sampled works are at liberty to take a number of 
actions in response to a request for a license that include, but are not 
limited to, refusing to license the work,
80
 granting a license for a flat fee, 
 
 
YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 209 (Free Press 7th ed. 2009). Generally speaking, 
the Harry Fox Agency will issue licenses and make sure that users are paying the compulsory licensing 
fee for a small fee. Id. at 221. 
 74. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2006). Section 115(a)(2) states: 
A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical arrangement of the work to 
the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performance 
involved, but the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental character of 
the work, and shall not be subject to protection as a derivative work under this title, except 
with the express consent of the copyright owner.  
Id.; see also PASSMAN, supra note 73, at 209–11 (describing the conditions necessary to obtain a 
license under § 115(a)(2)). 
 75. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 23, at 1608. Kohn explains that Congress included § 115(a)(2) 
because they ―recognized the legitimate interests of songwriters who might wish to prevent their 
musical works from being ‗perverted, distorted, or travestied.‘‖ Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 
109 (1976)). 
 76. PASSMAN, supra note 73, at 318–19. 
 77. Most of the cases producing published decisions are discussed infra in Part II. 
 78. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 25, at 86. As McLeod notes, this didn‘t stop artists 
from lying about the use of samples they didn‘t think anyone would ever discover. Id. 
 79. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 25, at 86. 
 80. As noted above, owners of the sound recording may refuse to license the sampled recording 
because they are not compelled to license the work under the Copyright Act. See supra note 70 and 
accompanying text. Moreover, the ―right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed 
in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality‖—precisely 
what is being licensed by the copyright holder in the sound recording when a sound recording is 
sampled—fits squarely within the rights of the copyright holder. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b); see also infra 
notes 98–103 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusive rights of copyright holders in sound 
recordings). Likewise, nor are owners of the copyright in the sampled musical composition compelled 
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granting a license for a royalty, or asking for an ownership stake in the 
copyright in the new composition containing the sample.
81
 Leverage in 
this situation depends on whether the use of the sample would constitute 
infringement—and, without a license, there is usually a high probability of 
infringement.
82
 For the most part, whether the work constitutes an 
infringing use and what demands the holder of the underlying copyright 
will have in order to permit its use will be unknown until the new work 
containing the sample has already been created and is a finished product.
83
  
One might ask, what is so bad about this process? The inherent 
problem is that the entire process is cost-prohibitive; the cost of clearing 
small samples has a tendency to eat up a recording budget, and thus the 
average artist will often forego sampling in order to avoid the cost.
84
 
Moreover, a related concern is the substantial waste of creative time and 
energy that results when the cost of licensing ultimately prevents the 
commercial exploitation of the newly created work.  
Consider the following example. Assume, in the interest of simplicity, 
that a sample is being licensed for a flat fee from both the owner of the 
sound recording and the musical composition.
85
 The average flat fee 
license ranges from $2,500 to $20,000.
86
 The average recording agreement 
for a new artist to record an album for a major record label is between 
$100,000 and $250,000.
87
 Add in attorney‘s fees or the cost of hiring a 
 
 
to license their copyrights because sampling changes ―the basic melody or fundamental character of 
the work,‖ thus giving complete discretion to the copyright holder. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2006); see 
also supra note 74.  
 81. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 23, at 1609. 
 82. Id. 
 83. PASSMAN, supra note 73, at 319. 
 84. See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 1, at 158–63 (discussing the expense of licensing 
samples). McLeod and DiCola note that often those artists who do sample must ―abandon the 
traditional commercial-recording model‖ in order to afford the costs of sampling. Id. at 161. 
 85. As noted above, flat fee licensing is but one of the many types of licensing agreements that 
are negotiated by samplers. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 86. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 23, at 1548–49. 
 87. PASSMAN, supra note 73, at 91. This figure can vary depending on the notoriety of the 
artist—that is, whether the artist has already achieved some level of fame or is virtually unknown in 
the United States or elsewhere. Id. As such, depending on the artists‘ level of notoriety or fame, funds 
made available by record companies to record a single album can range from zero to $1,000,000 or 
higher. Id. Indeed, this paradigm may provide an explanation as to why famous artist can still afford to 
sample when licensing costs border on astronomical. See supra notes 25 and 26 and accompanying 
text (describing extreme licensing fees paid by famous artists in order to include samples on their 
records). 
 As Passman explains, these recording budgets are basically ―structured as funds.‖ PASSMAN, 
supra note 73, at 91. Thus, the advance comprises both a payment to the artist to survive on and the 
budget for the recording of the album. As such, the artist takes home any surplus not spent on 
recording. Id. Furthermore, although artists are usually paid royalties, those royalties are generally not 
payable until the record company has recouped the advanced funds. Id. at 79. 
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sample-clearance house
88
 to negotiate the license and draw up the 
necessary paperwork, and it becomes apparent how quickly a recording 
budget can be swallowed because the artist used a few samples.
89
 An artist 
is often better off creating a replay.
90
 A replay is a term of art referring to a 
musical fragment rerecorded by a studio musician to mimic a work an 
artist wishes to sample. By making a replay, the would-be sampler avoids 
licensing the sound recording he or she wishes to sample, and thus only 
has to pay a licensing fee to the holder of the copyright in the musical 
composition, usually the publisher.
91
 What follows, as more fully 
discussed infra, is that these economic hurdles have a negative effect on 
the choice of the creative means used to create new music.
92
  
II. THE LAW OF SAMPLING 
A. The Copyright Act and Copyright Law Theory 
This Note has identified some licensing issues that implicate copyright 
law, specifically the compulsory licensing requirements contained in 17 
U.S.C. § 115.
93
 As intimated by discussions in preceding parts, the law 
that generally governs in sampling litigation is federal copyright law.
94
 
The following discussion provides a general overview of the aspects of 
copyright that are relevant to music sampling. Additionally, it chronicles 
important court decisions that have shaped the legal issues that are 
implicated when musicians sample. 
 
 
 88. Sample-clearance houses are third-party companies whose sole purpose is to negotiate 
sampling licenses. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 25, at 87. 
 89. See id. at 86. 
 90. PASSMAN, supra note 73, at 319. 
 91. Id.; see also FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 25, at 87. McLeod notes that it is now 
common practice for hip-hop artist to hire musicians and specifically instruct the musician to mimic a 
known performance. Id. More specifically, he recounts that Chuck D., a member of the famous rap 
group Public Enemy, went as far as to hire Stephen Stills to sing a portion of a Buffalo Springfield 
song (Stills was the writer and lead singer for Buffalo Springfield), because it was cheaper to merely 
license the copyright from Stills‘ music publisher than to pay Atlantic Records for the rights to sample 
the original recording. Id. 
 92. See infra Part III.B. 
 93. See supra Part I.C. 
 94. Of course, when dealing with licensing issues, the law of contracts may be at issue. However, 
any such issues are beyond the scope of this Note. 
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1. Rights 
The United States Constitution provides Congress with the power ―[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.‖95 Pursuant to this power, Congress enacted the 
Copyright Act, which has been amended over time.
96
 As necessary, 
Congress has made such amendments in order to accommodate a number 
of technological advances and has expanded copyright law, providing 
specialized protections in particular fields.
97
 
As previously mentioned, under the Copyright Act and its various 
amendments, sampling of sound recordings implicates the rights of two 
copyright holders, which may or may not be the same person or entity: 
(1) copyright in the sampled sound recording and (2) the copyright in the 
underlying musical composition.
98
 Those who own copyrights in these 
works enjoy certain exclusive rights regarding their copyrights. In the case 
of musical compositions, copyright owners enjoy the right to 
(1) reproduce, (2) make derivative works, (3) distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the work, (4) perform the work publicly, and (5) display 
the work publicly.
99
 In 1971, Congress extended certain protections to 
owners of sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972.
100
 The owner of 
a copyright in a sound recording retains the exclusive right to 
(1) reproduce, (2) make derivative works, (3) distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the work, and (4) perform the recording ―publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission.‖101 However, these rights are 
 
 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Supreme Court has recognized that the introductory phrase 
of this article, and particularly the word ―promote,‖ indicates that action by Congress should be 
intended to stimulate, encourage, and induce artists and inventors to create new things and to further 
the progress of the arts and sciences. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); see also 1 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (2010). 
 96. See generally Title 17 of the United States Code. 
 97. See, e.g., Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971), amended 
by Pub L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)) 
(providing protection for sound recordings); Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) 
(providing owners of sound recordings with the exclusive right to perform works by means of digital 
audio transmission); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (addressing issues regarding copyright and the 
Internet). 
 98. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 23, at 1598. 
 99. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5) (2006). 
 100. See generally Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). 
 101. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3), (6) (2006). 
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significantly curtailed by 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
102
 The limitation most 
significant to music sampling is that the right to prepare derivative works 
of a sound recording is limited to the ―right to prepare a derivative work in 
which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, 
remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality.‖103 
2. Infringement 
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.,
104
 the 
Court held that establishment of copyright infringement requires proof of 
two elements: ―(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of 
constituent elements of the work that are original.‖105 The first element—
ownership—is easily established in cases where the copyright is registered 
with the United States Copyright Office. Under the Copyright Act, a valid 
registration is prima facie evidence of ownership.
106
  
As to the second element—copying—proof of actionable copying is 
much more complicated. Proving that there was in fact copying boils 
down to two basic components: (1) whether the alleged copier had access 
to the copyrighted work and (2) whether the works are substantially 
similar.
107
 Since most sampled works are widely available, access to the 
sampled work generally will not be at issue.
108
 Hence, at the heart of the 
inquiry in sampling cases is whether the works are substantially similar.
109
  
 
 
 102. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2006). The relevant text is as follows: 
The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (1) of section 
106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords or 
copies that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording. The 
exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (2) of section 106 
is limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the 
sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality. The 
exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) of 
section 106 do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that 
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate 
or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording. The exclusive rights of the owner of 
copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 106 do not apply to 
sound recordings included in educational television and radio programs (as defined in section 
397 of title 47) distributed or transmitted by or through public broadcasting entities (as 
defined by section 118(g)): Provided, [t]hat copies or phonorecords of said programs are not 
commercially distributed by or through public broadcasting entities to the general public. 
Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 105. Id. at 361; see also 4 NIMMER, supra note 95, § 13.01. 
 106. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006); see also 4 NIMMER, supra note 95, § 13.01[A]. 
 107. 4 NIMMER, supra note 95, § 13.01[B]. 
 108. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc. (Bridgeport II), 585 F.3d 267, 273 
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In his treatise, Nimmer—the leading expert on copyright law—
explains that there are two categorizations of substantial similarity: 
comprehensive non-literal similarity
110
 and fragmented literal similarity.
111
 
The latter of these two theories—fragmented literal similarity—is 
implicated in the sampling context.
112
 Under this theory of substantial 
similarity, the alleged infringer appropriates, in a literal manner, a portion 
of the allegedly infringed copyright.
113
 The most salient question with 
regard to this theory is ―[a]t what point does such fragmented similarity 
become substantial so as to constitute the borrowing an infringement?‖114 
Thus, courts must determine the importance of the fragment and whether 
the fragment is quantitatively and qualitatively important enough to 
amount to infringement.
115
 Nimmer notes that even where the quantity of 
the fragment is small, a court may still find substantial similarity if the 
small portion is qualitatively important.
116
 
3. Defenses 
The most common defenses to allegations of copyright infringement in 
the sampling context are that (1) the sampling is a fair use
117
 or (2) the 
 
 
(6th Cir. 2009) (noting that the sampled work was one that was widely used by rap and hip-hop 
artists). 
 109. Id. at 273–74. 
 110. 4 NIMMER, supra note 95, § 13.03[A][1]. 
 111. Id. § 13.03[A][2]. Although these terms are products of Nimmer‘s scholarship and do not 
originate from judicial opinions, Nimmer notes that this terminology has been cited with approval by 
courts in a number of opinions. Id. § 13.03[A] n.9. 
 112. Id. § 13.03[A][2][b] (―On general principles, it would seem that the practice of digitally 
sampling prior music to use in a new composition should not be subject to any special analysis: to the 
extent that the resulting product is substantially similar to the sampled original, liability should 
result.‖) (footnotes omitted). 
 113. Id. § 13.03[A][2][a]. 
 114. Id. § 13.03[A][2]. Nimmer further explains that one must ascertain ―whether the similarity 
relates to matter that constitutes a substantial portion of plaintiff‘s work—not whether such material 
constitutes a substantial portion of defendant‘s work.‖ Id. § 13.03[A][2][a]. Using sampling as an 
example of this principle Nimmer explains that ―the fact that the sampled material is played 
throughout defendants’ song cannot establish liability, if that snippet constitutes an insubstantial 
portion of plaintiff’s composition.‖ Id. § 13.03[A][2][a]. 
 115. Id. § 13.03[A][2][a]. 
 116. Id. Specifically addressing the music context, Nimmer explains that ―[a]lthough it could be 
safely said that a similarity limited to a single note never suffices, the superstition among many 
musicians that the copying of three bars from a musical work can never constitute an infringement is, 
of course, without foundation. . . . Rather, the evaluation must occur in the context of each case, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively.‖ Id. 
 117. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Bridgeport Music, Inc. 
v. UMG Recordings, Inc. (Bridgeport II), 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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sampling is de minimis.
118
 The fair use doctrine is a statutory affirmative 
defense,
119
 which provides that ―fair use of a copyrighted work, including 
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords . . . for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies 
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright.‖120 In applying this doctrine, the statute prescribes application 
of a four-part balancing test to determine whether a particular use is a fair 
use. The statute states: 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—  
 (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes;  
 (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
 (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and  
 (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.
121
  
As discussed in Parts II.B.1 and III.A.1, application of the fair use 
doctrine in the sampling context has not provided much solace for 
samplers. In light of the Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence finding that 
commercial uses are presumptively unfair,
122
 many courts have 
erroneously relied on this proposition to dismiss claims of fair use.
123
 
However, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc.
124—which held that a 
commercial work, which was a parody, was a fair use
125—the Supreme 
 
 
 118. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 119. The doctrine of fair use finds its roots in the common law and was codified in 1976. 
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (Oct. 19, 1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2006)). According the House Report, codifying the fair use doctrine was ―intended to restate the 
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.‖ H.R. REP. NO. 
94-1476, at 66 (1976). 
 120. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (―[E]very 
commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly 
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright . . . .‖). 
 123. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 95, § 13.05[A][1][c]. 
 124. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 125. Id. at 594. 
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Court explained that none of the four factors is conclusive, and that the 
commercial quality of the work simply ―tends to weigh against a finding 
of fair use.‖126 Regardless of the explanation of Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. contained in Acuff-Rose,
127
 it appears that the 
fair use defense as it is currently applied will not be a successful defense 
for samplers, even when the use is transformative, primarily due the 
commercial quality of the work and the impact on the exploitability of the 
sampled work.
128
 
The de minimis use doctrine applies the legal maxim of de miminis non 
curat lex—meaning ―the law does not concern itself with trifles‖—in the 
copyright context.
129
 Nimmer eloquently states that in copyright law, de 
minimis copying ―represents simply the converse of substantial 
similarity‖—i.e., that the copying is so small that it is negligible, and thus 
not actionable.
130
 With regard to sampling litigation, this defense has met 
two significant obstacles. First, courts must discern where to draw the line 
with regard to how much sampling is too much.
131
 This is determined by 
evaluating whether an ―average audience [member] would not recognize 
the appropriation.‖132 The second, and more controversial, obstacle comes 
as a result of the Ninth Circuit‘s holding in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films,
133
 which rejects application of the de minimis use 
doctrine in the sampling context with regard to sound recordings. 
B. The Cases Addressing Music Sampling and Copyright Infringement 
In the early 1990s, courts began to encounter lawsuits regarding 
unauthorized sampling of musical works. In one of the earliest cases 
 
 
 126. Id. at 585; see also 4 NIMMER, supra note 95, § 13.05[A][1][c] (explaining that ―[t]aken 
literally, [the] statement [in Sony quoted above] would cause the fair use analysis to collapse . . . .‖). 
 127. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 128. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc. (Bridgeport II), 585 F.3d. 267, 
278 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that although the use of various samples was transformative, a finding of 
fair use would cause the plaintiff to ―lose substantial licensing revenue if it were deprived of its right 
to license content such as that used by [the defendant].‖); see also infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the 
application of fair use in the sampling context in greater depth). 
 129. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (9th ed. 2009); see also 2 NIMMER, supra note 95, 
§ 8.01[G]. 
 130. 2 NIMMER, supra note 95, § 8.01[G]. 
 131. Compare Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d. 1189, 1196–97 (concluding that as a matter of law a 
three note sample was de minimis), with id. at 1197 (Graber, J., dissenting) (concluding that there was 
sufficient evidence that a finder of fact could determine that a three not sample was not de minimis and 
thus substantially similar). 
 132. Id. at 1193 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 133. 410 F.3d 792, 800–01 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to apply the de minimis use doctrine and 
holding that, in the case of sound recordings, any unlicensed sampling is an infringement). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/4
  
 
 
 
 
2012] SAMPLING THE CIRCUITS 1179 
 
 
 
 
addressing sampling, Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. 
Records,
134
 the court took a firm stance regarding infringement. The 
opening words of the opinion are illustrative: ―Thou shalt not steal.‖135 In 
Grand Upright Music, Biz Markie—a famous rap artist—sampled a 
portion of Raymond ―Gilbert‖ O‘Sullivan‘s ―Alone Again (Naturally).‖136 
The sampled portion—a three-word sample—appeared on Markie‘s album 
I Need A Haircut on the track ―Alone Again.‖137 The defendants had 
contacted O‘Sullivan and Upright Grand Music in an effort to obtain a 
license to use the sample, but O‘Sullivan declined the request.138 Once the 
court had determined O‘Sullivan and Grand Upright Music were in fact 
the owners of the copyright in both the master recording and the 
underlying composition, it held that the combination of the defendants 
being aware that they needed to obtain a licensing to use the sample and 
their ―callous disregard for the law and for the rights of others‖ was 
sufficient grounds to grant a preliminary injunction preventing the 
infringing use.
139
 Beyond this bald holding, the opinion in Grand Upright 
Music contains almost no reference to the substantive law of copyright or 
Title 17. 
In 1993, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
dealt with the issue of digital sampling in the music context in Jarvis v. A 
& M Records.
140
 In Jarvis, the defendants sampled a portion of Boyd 
Jarvis‘s ―The Music Got Me,‖141 which appeared in defendant‘s song ―Get 
Dumb! Free Your Body.‖142 The court stated that ―[i]n order to prove 
copyright infringement, the plaintiff must establish that he or she owns a 
valid copyright, that the defendants copied a protectable expression, and 
 
 
 134. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 135. Id. at 183. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 184. 
 139. Id. at 185. Additionally, the court referred the matter to the United States District Attorney 
for the Southern District of New York for possible criminal prosecution under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) and 
18 U.S.C. § 2319. Id. Following the aftermath of Grand Upright Music, Biz Markie re-released the 
album I Need a Haircut in 1995; however, ―Alone Again‖ was omitted. See BIZ MARKIE, I NEED A 
HAIRCUT (Cold Chillin‘ Records 1995) (omitting ―Alone Again‖ from the track listing). 
 140. 827 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993). 
 141. Jarvis‘ group, Visual, recorded the song. Id. at 286. Jarvis was the owner of the copyright in 
the composition and the arrangement, while Prelude Records owned the copyright in the sound 
recording. Id. In addition to a claim for copyright infringement of the musical composition, Jarvis 
brought a claim for infringement of the sound recording. Id. The court granted summary judgment on 
this claim, finding that Jarvis had no copyright in the sound recording. Id. at 292–93. 
 142. Id. at 286. The two sampled portions were (1) ―the bridge section, which contains the words 
‗ooh . . . move . . . free your body‘‖ and (2) ―a distinctive keyboard riff, which functions as both a 
rhythm and melody.‖ Id. at 289. 
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that the copying is substantial enough to constitute improper appropriation 
of plaintiff‘s work.‖143 After disposing of the first two prongs,144 the court 
found that it was ―not clear as a matter of law that the portions copied 
from plaintiff‘s song were insignificant to plaintiff‘s song‖ and thus 
denied defendant‘s motion for summary judgment.145  
Following these initial cases regarding sampling, as discussed above, 
samplers have used two primary defenses when accused of infringement as 
a result of sampling: fair use and de minimis use.
146
 
1. Fair Use Cases 
The Supreme Court delivered its only opinion pertaining to music 
sampling in 1994 when it decided Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
147
 
The primary issue in the case was whether a commercial parody of a song 
constituted a fair use in the music sampling context.
148
 2 Live Crew, a 
popular rap group at the time, released a song entitled ―Pretty Woman‖149 
which was a rap parody of ―Oh, Pretty Woman,‖ a song famously 
performed by Roy Orbison.
150
 The 2 Live Crew composition featured 
parodic lyrics
151
 that were allegedly intended to ―satirize the original 
 
 
 143. Id. at 288. 
 144. The court relied on the following evidence: (1) plaintiff had a certificate from the United 
States Copyright Office showing he owned the copyright in the musical composition and arrangement 
and (2) the defendants had admitted to using the sample. Id. at 289. 
 145. Id. at 292. The court‘s analysis was predicated on acceptance of Nimmer‘s theory of 
―fragmented literal similarity.‖ See supra notes 111–16 and accompanying text (explaining the theory 
of fragmented literal similarity).  
 146. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 147. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 148. Id. at 571–72. 
 149. Id. at 572. Luther R. Campbell, who was a member of 2 Live Crew, composed the work. Id.; 
see also 2 LIVE CREW, Pretty Woman, on AS NASTY AS THEY WANNA BE (Lil‘ Joe Records, Inc. 
1989). 
 150. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 572. For an orginal recording of this Roy Orbison classic, see ROY 
ORBISON, Oh, Pretty Woman, on ORBISONGS (Monument Records 1965). ―Oh, Pretty Woman‖ was 
composed by Orbison and William Dees in 1964. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 572. Both Orbison and Dees 
assigned their copyright in the composition to Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., a music publisher, who was the 
plaintiff in the original action and the respondent in the instant case. Id. Note that the copyright in the 
sound recording was not at issue because (1) Monument Records, the owner of the original master 
recording was not a party to the lawsuit, and (2) the Copyright Act has not yet been extended to 
provide protection for sound recordings recorded prior to 1972 (―Oh, Pretty Woman‖ was recorded in 
1965). See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text. 
 151. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 594–96 apps. A–B. The Court‘s opinion rests largely on the 
similarities between the lyrics and melodies of ―Oh, Pretty Woman‖ and ―Pretty Woman‖ and largely 
ignores the actual sampling of the original sound recording and the implications of this sampling on 
the infringement of the underlying musical composition. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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work‖152 in addition to a sampled portion of a very recognizable guitar 
riff.
153
 Prior to releasing the work, 2 Live Crew‘s management contacted 
Acuff-Rose and offered to give credit to Acuff-Rose, Orbison, and Dees, 
and pay for the use; however, Acuff-Rose declined and refused to permit 2 
Live Crew‘s use.154 Nonetheless, 2 Live Crew released ―Pretty Woman‖ 
without Acuff-Rose‘s permission.155 In determining whether 2 Live 
Crew‘s use constituted a fair use, the Court conducted an in-depth analysis 
of the fair use factors set forth in § 107 of the Copyright Act.
156
 The Court 
ultimately found that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred in 
finding ―that the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew‘s parody of ‗Oh, 
Pretty Woman‘ rendered it presumptively unfair‖ and that ―no such 
evidentiary presumption [was] available . . . in determining whether a 
transformative use, such as a parody, is a fair one.‖157 In its rationale 
supporting this conclusion, the Court set forth a number of important 
propositions that might be relevant to the application of fair use in the 
music-sampling context. First, the Court clarified that when considering 
the first factor of the fair use test,
158
 ―the more transformative the new 
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.‖159 With 
regard to the third factor,
160
 the Court emphasized, ―this factor calls for 
thought not only about the quantity of the materials used, but about their 
quality and importance, too.‖161 
The most recent case dealing with the fair use defense in the music-
sampling context, decided in 2009, comes from the Sixth Circuit. In 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc.,
162
 the court examined a 
jury verdict finding that the fair use defense did not apply to a particular 
sampling of a composition.
163
 The sampled work was a composition by 
 
 
 152. Id. at 572. 
 153. Compare ROY ORBISON, supra note 150, at 0:02 (famous guitar riff), with 2 LIVE CREW, 
supra note 149, at 0:04, 1:04, 1:46, 2:15, and 2:52 (locations where the famous guitar riff appears in 
the 2 Live Crew recording). 
 154. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 572–73. 
 155. Id. at 573. 
 156. Id. at 576–94.  
 157. Id. at 594. 
 158. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006) (stating that said test relies upon ―the purpose and character of the 
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes‖). 
 159. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 160. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006) (stating that this factor turns upon ―the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole‖). 
 161. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587. 
 162. 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 163. Id. at 277–78. 
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David Spradley, Garry Shider, and George Clinton entitled ―Atomic 
Dog.‖164 The samples at issue were the use of the word ―dog,‖ ―rhythmic 
panting,‖ and the ―Bow Wow‖ refrain.165 The samples appeared in 
―D.O.G. in me,‖ a recording by artist Public Announcement.166 Finding 
that the jury was properly instructed as to the standards regarding a finding 
of substantial similarity, fair use, and willfulness,
167
 the court stated a 
number of important propositions regarding findings of infringement as a 
result of music sampling. First, the court found no error in instructing a 
jury as to Nimmer‘s theory of fragmented literal similarity and 
acknowledged ―the copying of a relatively small but qualitatively 
important or crucial element can be an appropriate basis upon which to 
find substantial similarity.‖168 As an evidentiary matter, the court held that 
where a song is composed in the studio, the original sound recording may 
serve as the fixed form of the copyrighted composition.
169
 The court also 
conducted a fair use inquiry, concluding that there was no fair use defense 
available.
170
 The rationale behind this holding was that, although the use 
was transformative, the sampled parts were recognizable and protectable 
by copyright and revenues from licenses would likely be lost if Bridgeport 
was deprived the right to license the work.
171
 
 
 
 164. Id. at 272; see also GEORGE CLINTON, Atomic Dog, on COMPUTER GAMES (Capitol Records 
1982) (original recording of ―Atomic Dog‖). The court noted in its opinion that expert testimony 
established that Atomic Dog was an ―anthem of the funk era‖ and ―one of the most famous songs of 
the whole repertoire of funk and R & B.‖ Bridgeport II, 585 F.3d at 273.  
 165. Bridgeport II, 585 F.3d at 273. The word ―dog‖ in the original work was described as a 
―stand alone melody of one word.‖ Id. at 276. The ―Bow Wow‖ refrain referenced by the court is the 
famous lyric ―bow wow wow yippie yo yippie yay, bow wow yippie yo yay.‖ See GEORGE CLINTON, 
supra note 164. 
 166. Bridgeport II, 585 F.3d at 273; see also PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, D.O.G. in me, on ALL 
WORK, NO PLAY (Universal Records 1998). The original release was on A & M Records; however, A 
& M became a division of UMG a year after the record‘s initial release. Bridgeport II, 585 F.3d at 273. 
Because of this merger, UMG was the named defendant in this lawsuit. Id. 
 167. The scope of this Note is limited to determinations of infringement; as such, an examination 
of the willfulness holding is omitted from this discussion as willfulness is a factor used to determine 
the extent of remedial measures prescribed by the court. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).  
 168. Bridgeport II, 585 F.3d at 275. This recognition is a departure from the court‘s holding in 
Bridgeport I. Id. This holding could be interpreted to implicitly recognize that relatively small 
elements that are not qualitatively significant may not qualify for protection for lack of substantial 
similarity. 
 169. Id. at 276. Under this theory, the elements contained in the original sound recording are 
identical to the elements of a composition regardless of the improvisational elements that may have not 
been contemplated prior to recording. This created a temporal issue as to whether the first fixed form 
or the registered fixed form was the embodiment of the composition. Id. In any event, the court 
essentially eviscerates any perception or requirement that sheet music is required as evidence of a 
copyright in an original composition. Id. 
 170. Id. at 278. 
 171. Id. 
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2. De Minimis Use Cases 
A virtual circuit split
172
 has developed as a result of holdings in Newton 
v. Diamond
173
 and Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films.
174
 Both of 
these cases dealt primarily with the issue of whether the doctrine of de 
minimis use was applicable in the sampling context.
175
 Newton involved 
the Beastie Boys‘ use of a three-note sample from a song entitled 
―Choir‖176 composed by jazz flutist and composer James W. Newton in 
their song ―Pass the Mic.‖177 Prior to releasing ―Pass the Mic,‖ the Beastie 
Boys obtained a license from ECM, the owner of the sound recording, to 
sample the recording.
178
 Therefore, the claim of infringement was solely 
based on the Beastie Boys‘ unauthorized use of the underlying 
composition.
179
 As such, the court‘s holding only addressed whether the 
―unauthorized use of the composition itself was substantial enough to 
sustain an infringement claim.‖180 The court ultimately concluded that, 
although the three-note sequence appeared in the score, no reasonable 
juror could find that the three-note sequence sampled was a ―quantitatively 
or qualitatively significant portion of the composition.‖181 Accordingly, 
 
 
 172. This Note uses this categorization because the cases are distinguishable: the scope of the 
Newton opinion is limited to infringement of a musical composition, whereas Bridgeport I is limited to 
infringement of sound recordings. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (―[O]ur 
inquiry is confined to whether the unauthorized use of the composition itself was substantial enough to 
sustain an infringement claim.‖) (emphasis added); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films 
(Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d 792, 798 (6th Cir. 2005) (―We address this issue only as it pertains to sound 
recording copyrights.‖) (emphasis added). However, as discussed infra in Part III.A.2, a distinction on 
this basis is problematic for a number of reasons, and thus this Note argues that the conflict can be 
fairly categorized as a circuit split although other commentators may argue to the contrary. At least 
one commentator has argued that the cases do not represent a circuit split. See Tracy L. Reilly, 
Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital Sampling: An Endorsement of the Bridgeport Music 
Court’s Attempt to Afford “Sound” Copyright Protection to Sound Recordings, 31 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 355, 370 (2008). 
 173. 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 174. 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 175. Newton, 388 F.3d at 1190 (―[W]hether the incorporation of a short segment of a musical 
recording into a new musical recording, i.e., the practice of ‗sampling,‘ requires a license to use both 
the performance and the composition of the original recording.‖); Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 798 (―The 
heart of Westbound‘s arguments is the claim that no substantial similarity or de minimis inquiry should 
be undertaken at all when the defendant has not disputed that it digitally sampled a copyrighted sound 
recording.‖). 
 176. See JAMES NEWTON, Choir, on AXUM (EMC Records 1982) (sampled recording). 
 177. Newton, 388 F.3d at 1191; see also THE BEASTIE BOYS, Pass the Mic, on CHECK YOUR 
HEAD (Capitol Records, Inc. 1992).  
 178. Newton, 388 F.3d at 1191.  
 179. Id. at 1193. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1195. 
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the Ninth Circuit held the Beastie Boys‘ use of the three-note portion of 
Newton‘s composition was de minimis; thus, the Beastie Boys‘ failure to 
clear the sample and pay mechanical royalties to Newton was not 
actionable.
182
 
The Sixth Circuit reached a very different conclusion when evaluating 
the music sampling issue in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films.
183
 
Bridgeport I resulted from action taken by Bridgeport Music, Southfield 
Music, Westbound Records, and Nine Records.
184
 In Bridgeport I, 
Westbound Records sued No Limit Films
185
 for using an unlicensed 
sample from the sound recording of ―Get Off Your Ass and Jam‖186 in the 
movie soundtrack for I Got the Hook Up.
187
 The sample used was a three-
note guitar solo taken from the introduction of ―Get Off Your Ass and 
Jam.‖188 The sample was altered in two ways: (1) the sample was looped 
and extended to sixteen beats and (2) the pitch was altered.
189
 Limiting its 
holding as being applicable only in the context of sound recordings, the 
Sixth Circuit rejected the de minimis use paradigm, holding that ―[i]f you 
cannot pirate the whole sound recording‖ you cannot ―‗sample‘ something 
less than the whole‖ without being subject to liability for infringement.190 
Thus, if Bridgeport I and Newton are read together, one of two 
conclusions must be reached: either (1) the specific exclusive rights in 
sound recordings and musical compositions respectively are, broadly 
 
 
 182. Id. at 1192. 
 183. 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 184. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 795. This action began with a complaint alleging almost 500 counts 
of copyright infringement and state law claims against approximately 800 different defendants. Id. The 
District Court severed the complaint, resulting in 476 separate actions. Id. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
UMG Recordings, Inc. (Bridgeport II), 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009) is one such action. For a 
discussion of this case and its implications on the application of the fair use doctrine in sampling cases 
see supra notes 162–70 and accompanying text. 
 185. Copyright infringement claims by plaintiffs Bridgeport Music, Inc., Southfield Music, Inc., 
and Nine Records, Inc. were dismissed on summary judgment by the District Court and were not 
appealed. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 795; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, L.L.C., 320 F. 
Supp. 2d 830, 838 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). Claims against defendants Miramax Film Corp. and Dimension 
Films were settled and dismissed with prejudice. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d. at 795 n.1. 
 186. See FUNKADELIC, Get Off Your Ass and Jam, on LET‘S TAKE IT TO THE STAGE (Westbound 
Records Inc. 1975). 
 187. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 795. The original recording at issue was N.W.A.‘s ―100 miles and 
Runnin‘,‖ which appeared on the soundtrack for the movie. See I GOT THE HOOK UP (Dimension Films 
1998). For an original recording of ―100 Miles and Runnin‘,‖ see N.W.A., 100 Miles and Runnin’, on 
N.W.A.: GREATEST HITS (Priority Records, Inc. 1996). 
 188. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 796. 
 189. Id. The sample appeared in the recording five times. Id. 
 190. Id. at 800. 
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speaking, entitled to different levels of copyright protection,
191
 or (2) one 
of these courts has incorrectly applied the de minimis use doctrine. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT STATE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AND ITS 
EFFECTS ON MUSIC SAMPLING 
A. Problems Resulting from Judicial Application of Legal Standards in 
Sampling Litigation 
As previously mentioned, the application of available defenses in the 
sampling context seems to offer little protection for samplers. The fair use 
doctrine appears to fall short of providing any leeway for samplers except 
where the sampler has created a parodic work.
192
 Additionally, the de 
minimis use doctrine seems to be problematic as there is a split among the 
circuits as to whether they should be applicable in sampling cases.
193
 The 
following analysis examines both of these doctrines and attempts to 
ascertain whether the doctrines are simply misapplied by judges or 
conversely whether, although problematic, the judicial application of these 
doctrines is sound. 
1. Problems with the Application of the Fair Use Doctrine 
The major obstacle regarding the application of the fair use doctrine is 
that under the first factor of the fair use analysis—―whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes‖194—the 
Supreme Court has held that, where the use is commercial, although not 
presumptively unfair as intimated in Sony, this factor tends to weigh 
against a finding of fair use.
195
 Although the Court explained in Acuff-Rose 
that the more transformative the work, the less relevant the commercial 
nature of the work becomes,
196
 commentators have observed that the 
 
 
 191. As noted above, it is true that sound recordings are afforded fewer exclusive rights. See supra 
notes 99 and 101 and accompanying text. However, what is being suggested here is that this 
interpretation of the cases would indicate the degree to which each of those rights is enforced is 
different depending on the subject matter sought to be protected (i.e., whether the work is a musical 
composition or sound recording). 
 192. See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)). 
 193. Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th 
Cir. 2005), with Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 194. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006). 
 195. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 585 (1994). 
 196. Id. at 579 (―[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of 
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.‖). 
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overwhelming nature of the commercial quality of most works containing 
samples will, in practical application, result in a finding that the use was 
not a fair one for purposes of the Copyright Act.
197
 Similarly, the forth 
factor—―the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work‖198—would not support a finding of fair use due to the 
fact that, in most cases, permitting unlicensed sampling would, at least to 
some extent, reduce the market for derivative works of underlying 
copyrighted work.
199
 Thus, under Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises, the fourth factor would weigh against a finding of fair 
use.
200
 Metaphorically speaking, samplers are essentially coming up to the 
plate with two strikes against them based on the commercial quality of the 
works alone. As to the third factor—―the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole‖201—one 
commentator suggests that most samples are found to be qualitatively 
substantial, otherwise they would not have been sampled in the first 
place.
202
 Due to jurisprudence that would militate against a finding of fair 
use, unless the sample appears in parodic work like 2 Live Crew‘s ―Pretty 
Woman,‖ success of theories based on the fair use doctrine to justify the 
unlicensed use of even the smallest samples looks bleak at best. 
2. Problems with the Application of the De Minimis Use Doctrine 
Judicial decisions interpreting the de minimis use doctrine in sampling 
litigation are problematic, as they seem to misapply this defense. The 
holding in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films poses a number of 
problems. First, the ―literal reading approach‖ taken by the court in 
interpreting provisions of the Sound Recording Act of 1971 is 
problematic.
203
 If accepted, the court‘s ―no sampling without a license‖ 
approach, which rejects the de minimis use doctrine, would presumably 
 
 
 197. See, e.g., KOHN & KOHN, supra note 23, at 1604–05.  
 198. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006). 
 199. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 417 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (―[T]o 
negate fair use one need only show that if the challenged use ‗should become widespread, it would 
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.‘‖ (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 539, 568 (1985))); KOHN & KOHN, supra note 23, at 1606. 
 200. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 23, at 1606. 
 201. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006). 
 202. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 23, at 1605. This Note would challenge this proposition, and 
suggest that samples of say, a snare drum, might not be qualitatively significant. Yet, samplers tend to 
sample drums from other works regularly. See KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING CULTURE 90 (Peter Lang 
2001) (describing the practice of using multiple sampled kick drums in combination to create a new 
kick drum sound). 
 203. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 805. 
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provide copyright holders in sound recordings with greater protections 
against unauthorized sampling than the copyright holder in the underlying 
musical work embodied in the sound recording.
204
 This is because, 
although de minimis amounts of musical compositions may be sampled 
per Newton without a license, similar quantities of sound recordings are 
absolutely off limits unless the sample is licensed. This simply cannot be 
correct. The legislative history regarding the enactment of the Sound 
Recording Act explains that Congress intended to grant a limited right for 
the owner of a sound recording that was no broader than rights afforded to 
musical compositions.
205
 Further, 17 U.S.C. § 106 clearly indicates that the 
number of rights afforded to sound recording copyrights are fewer than 
those granted musical composition copyrights.
206
 What follows seems 
clear, although it is not explicit: sound recordings are afforded fewer 
protections than musical compositions, not greater protections. As such, it 
seems inherently incorrect to provide sound recordings with such robust 
protection when the same or similar protection would not be afforded to 
musical compositions.
207
 
A second issue, which is problematic in the court‘s analysis in 
Bridgeport I, is that it removes the judicial inquiry into whether substantial 
similarity exists.
208
 Substantial similarity is a basic element of copyright 
infringement analysis and is necessary for a finding of infringement as a 
matter of law.
209
 As Nimmer indicates in his treatise, it is hard to justify 
sound recordings as being of such a special nature that they should be 
immune to the substantial similarity analysis when determining 
infringement.
210
  
 
 
 204. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text (comparing the exclusive rights pertinent to 
musical compositions and sound recordings). 
 205. JOHN MCCLELLAN, CREATION OF A LIMITED RIGHT IN SOUND RECORDINGS, S. Rep. No. 92-
72, at 6 (1971) (―In approving the creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings it is the intention 
of the committee that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights than are accorded to other 
copyright proprietors under the existing title 17.‖); see also KASTENMEIER, PROHIBITING PIRACY OF 
SOUND RECORDINGS, H.R. Rep. No 92-487, at 2–3 (1971) (indicating that the primary purpose of the 
sound recording act was to eliminate piracy and unauthorized distribution of records). Note that this 
runs contrary to Judge Guy‘s statement that ―legislative history is of little help.‖ Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d 
at 805. 
 206. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).  
 207. See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying de minimis use 
doctrine in the sampling context). 
 208. 4 NIMMER, supra note 95, § 13.03[A][2][b]. 
 209. Id. § 13.01[B]. 
 210. Id. § 13.03[A][2][b]; see also S. Rep. No. 92-72, supra note 205. 
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The application of the de minimis use doctrine is also problematic in 
Newton v. Diamond.
211
 First, the majority finds that the sample at issue—a 
three-note, two-part melody consisting of the notes C—Db—C played on 
a flute while a C note is sung into the flute—is sufficiently original to be 
protectable; however, the majority concludes that the sample is 
nonetheless de minimis.
212
 This is inherently contradictory: how can a 
work be protectable, yet infringing uses of the protectable portion cannot 
be actionable? Second, Judge Graber indicates that when applying the de 
minimis doctrine, there is an important question regarding who determines 
whether a particular use is de minimis.
213
 The majority determines that as a 
matter of law, the sample is de minimis.
214
 However, as the dissent 
explains, where there is a sufficiently original sample, it is up to a jury or 
the trier of fact to make a factual inquiry as to whether the sample is de 
minimis.
215
 Thus, where ―reasonable ears differ over the qualitative 
significance of the composition of the sampled material, summary 
judgment is inappropriate.‖216 Furthermore, when determining whether a 
work is de minimis, equal weight must be given to the quantitative 
significance of the sample and the qualitative importance of the sampled 
segment to the underlying work. 
B. Negative Effects on Creativity 
While clarity and consistency regarding the application of defenses to 
copyright infringement, as illustrated above, are two major problems with 
sampling litigation, commentators have also highlighted that, in its current 
state, the law has a profoundly negative effect on creativity.
217
 The 
problem, as articulated by one commentator, is that ―[e]thnocentric notions 
of creativity and maldistribution of political power in favor of established 
artists and media companies have already served to stifle expression—the 
exact opposite of the declared purpose of copyright law.‖218 Of course, the 
purpose referenced in this quote is to provide protection as a means of 
 
 
 211. 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 212. Id. at 1192, 1197. 
 213. Id. at 1197 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
 214. Id. at 1192. 
 215. Id. at 1198. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See generally JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
AFFECTS MUSICAL CREATIVITY (2006); see also FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 25, at 107–13; 
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 132–48 (2001). 
 218. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 217, at 148. 
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encouraging and promoting science and the useful arts, not giving 
complete monopolies to holders of existing copyrights.
219
 Essentially, this 
problem may stem from a lack of understanding: as this commentator 
highlights, the stifling of creativity stems from the fact that the persons 
who make and interpret the law are largely ignorant to the process and 
methods by which creativity occurs.
220
 This problem is only further 
highlighted by the fact that sampling could be seen as analogous to 
quotation—yet, when quoting from a literary work, the restrictions and 
implications are hardly as severe as those that result from unlicensed 
sampling.
221
 
Whatever the reason for the disparate treatment outlined above, it 
nonetheless has a negative effect on creativity. The primary cause of these 
negative effects is economic in nature, although criminal penalties are 
additional deterrents for samplers.
222
 As previously discussed, samplers 
either must pay extremely high licensing fees for samples or risk being 
sued—which ultimately results in paying considerable attorney‘s fees and 
a possible judgment.
223
 In light of these high costs, would-be samplers 
without the financial means to absorb these costs are making conscious 
decisions to sample less or not sample at all.
224
 As such, for many artists, 
the creative choice to sample has been supplanted by an economic choice 
not to sample.
225
 
IV. SOLVING THE PROBLEM: A PROPOSED COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME 
As highlighted by the previous parts, the current copyright regime is 
difficult to apply in cases of music sampling. Furthermore, licensing 
 
 
 219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra note 95. 
 220. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 217, at 148. For an in-depth discussion of the psychological 
underpinnings of creativity and creative processes, see generally R. KEITH SAWYER, EXPLAINING 
CREATIVITY: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN INNOVATION (2d ed. 2012). 
 221. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX 53–55 (2008). Lessig notes that, although there are similarities 
between quoting and sampling, the ―norms governing [sampling] are far more restrictive that the 
norms governing text.‖ Id. at 54. He further questions why text is treated in such a liberal manner, 
while ―quoting‖ music, art, or film is treated in a much more restrictive manner. Id. at 55. 
 222. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006) (proscribing criminal penalties for copyright infringement). 
 223. See supra Part I.C.; see also DEMERS, supra note 217, at 9. Demers notes that ―the cost of 
legally licensing master recordings is prohibitive, while unauthorized appropriation carries the risk of 
lawsuits with heavy monetary and criminal punishment.‖ Id. 
 224. OWNING CULTURE, supra note 202, at 89–99. McLeod notes that, in lieu of sampling freely, 
samplers often choose to (1) replicate samples with live musicians, saving from paying the owner of 
the master recording, (2) limit sampling to records which are in their own record companies‘ catalog, 
or (3) more effectively hide samples with effects (or signal processing). Id. at 94–95. 
 225. OWNING CULTURE, supra note 202, at 93 (quoting Redman on his choice not to use sampling 
on his newer recordings because of the high cost of licensing). 
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practices and expensive litigation have prevented samplers from using 
sampling in a creative sense. As such, clarity by way of legislative reform 
is a much-needed commodity. The idea of copyright reform as it applies to 
sampling, and to other new technology and creative processes that pose 
interpretive problems when applying current copyright regulations, is 
hardly a new idea. The following part provides a general overview of 
some of the solutions proposed by other commentators, but is by no means 
an exhaustive review of all the solutions proposed by commentators. Part 
IV concludes by proposing a different solution and applying it to the fact 
patterns presented in some of the previous litigation discussed above in 
order to examine its effectiveness in resolving some of the issues 
described in Part III. 
A. Solutions That Have Been Proposed By Other Commentators 
Commentators have suggested a number of ways to resolve the 
problems with determining to what extent unlicensed sampling is an 
infringement of a copyright. One approach has been to attempt to remedy 
the problems with the de minimis use jurisprudence. In this vein, one 
commentator has recently argued that the bright-line rule articulated in 
Bridgeport I
226
 is appropriate, at least until Congress decides to amend the 
Copyright Act.
227
 In attempting to ―debunk‖ what she has identified as the 
―top three myths‖ in the music industry about sampling, she suggests the 
following: (1) sampling is not akin to borrowing, quoting, or imitation of 
other works, primarily due to the fact that samplers physically take 
portions of the sampled work; (2) the legitimacy of sampling as an art 
form does not entitle samplers to sample freely; and (3) that samplers who 
suggest that ―it is wiser to err on the side of encouraging‖ creation rather 
than overprotection of copyrighted works are misguided.
228
 While points 
two and three might be considered reasonable propositions, this Note 
expresses some skepticism as to whether the analogy between sampling 
and quotation is as misplaced as suggested.
229
 Concluding that amendment 
to the Copyright Act is unlikely in the near future, this commentator 
recommends that the music industry ―take charge of the sampling dilemma 
by uniting all of its producers, recording companies and musicians under a 
 
 
 226. As you will recall, Bridgeport I articulated the following rule: ―[i]f you cannot pirate the 
whole sound recording, [you cannot] ‗lift‘ or ‗sample‘ something less than the whole.‖ Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 227. See generally Reilly, supra note 172. 
 228. Reilly, supra note 172, at 375–402, 386. 
 229. See supra notes 218–21 and accompanying text. 
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comprehensive, voluntary licensing scheme.‖230 This Note argues, 
however, this is precisely what the music industry has done. And, as 
illustrated above, this methodology has failed miserably, striking a balance 
that favors record companies and music publishers
231
 and stifles musical 
creativity to some extent.
232
  
Other commentators advocate for application of the de minimis use 
doctrine as applied in Newton to be applied to both sound recordings and 
musical compositions.
233
 Of course, as argued above, simply accepting the 
Newton holding poses problems—questions persist, as indicated in the 
Newton dissent, as to whether the majority‘s articulated standard was in 
fact correctly applied.
234
 Tweaking this approach slightly, others have 
suggested a middle ground, such as adding to the de minimis use analysis 
some of the fair use elements regarding the commercial effects of 
sampling on the exploitability of the work
235
 or adding an inquiry as to 
whether the infringing sampling frustrates authors‘ incentive to create new 
works.
236
 The former of these two solutions may provide little help largely 
because most sampling occurs in commercial works, generally tipping 
those factors in favor of a finding of infringment.
237
 With regard to the 
 
 
 230. Reilly, supra note 172, at 407–08. 
 231. See supra Part I.C (offering a detailed explanation of current sample clearing and licensing 
practices). To be explicit, while the songwriter of the underlying musical composition, of course, gets 
compensated through the present sample licensing scheme employed by the music industry, it is 
important to recognize that the entities who are negotiating and benefiting financially from licenses are 
music publishers. PASSMAN, supra note 73, at 218. Publishers, in most cases—provided that the artist 
does not have a co-publishing deal—usually take home 50 percent of the licensing fee. Id. at 216. In 
the case of licensing sound recordings, since record companies generally own the copyright in the 
master recording, licensing fees for the sound recording go to the record label and not the artist. Id. at 
318. Since the exploitation of these rights are important to publishers‘ and record companies‘ business 
models, they have little to no incentive to strike a different balance, making revisions to the current 
voluntary licensing scheme a questionable solution. 
 232. See supra Part III.B, discussing the effects of the current licensing regime and sampling 
jurisprudence on creativity. 
 233. See Mike Suppapola, Confusion in the Digital Age: Why the De Minimis Use Test Should Be 
Applied to Digital Samples of Copyrighted Sound Recordings, 14 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 93, 130 
(2006); Matthew R. Brodin, Comment, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: The Death of the 
Substantial Similarity Test in Digital Sampling Copyright Infringement Claims—The Sixth Circuit’s 
Flawed Attempt at a Bright-line Rule, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 825, 866–67 (2005) (arguing that the 
district court, which largely based its opinion on the Newton holding, provided the correct analysis and 
should not have been reversed by the Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport I). 
 234. See supra notes 213–16 and accompanying text. 
 235. Jeremy S. Sykes, Note, Copyright—The De Minimis Defense in Copyright Infringement 
Actions Involving Music Sampling, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 749, 780 (2006).  
 236. David S. Blessing, Note, Who Speaks Latin Anymore?: Translating De Minimis Use for 
Application to Music Copyright Infringement and Sampling, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2399, 2421–22 
(2004). 
 237. See supra notes 194–200 and accompanying text; see also infra note 272 and accompanying 
text (considering this issue in light of the proposed scheme). 
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latter solution, empirical evidence suggests that extrinsic factors—in this 
case, inability to stop certain infringements—are not the pimary 
motivation for creative output. Rather, ―expression of human creativity is 
primarily driven by intrinsic rather than by extrinsic factors.‖238 Thus, 
adding this inquiry would not be empirically supported as probative or 
useful. 
Another commentator has suggested that an extremely liberal 
application of the fair use doctrine would provide samplers with creative 
leeway, while still providing sufficient protections for owners of the 
underlying copyrights.
239
 Relying heavily on the fair use analysis used in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
240
 this commentator analyzes what he 
calls ―the Girl Talk Dilemma‖ under the fair use provision.241 Considering 
each factor in turn, his analysis concludes that Girl Talk‘s work could be 
defensible under the fair use provision because (1) his use of samples 
could be viewed as parody, transformative, or a criticism of the sampled 
work,
242
 (2) his works are ―creative and highly original,‖243 (3) mash-ups, 
like parody, must copy well-known works to be successful,
244
 and (4) there 
is little to moderate overlap with the market for the sampled works, and 
Girl Talk does not intend to compete with the sampled works.
245
 However 
 
 
 238. Diane L. Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 
THEORETICAL INQUIRES IN LAW 29, 43 (2011). 
 239. Mongillo, supra note 6. 
 240. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 241. Mongillo, supra note 6, at 23–31; see also supra notes 6–19 and accompanying text 
(explaining ―the Girl Talk Dilemma‖). 
 242. Mongillo, supra note 6, at 23–29. A similar argument has been accepted with regard to an 
artist using a copyrighted photograph to comment on ―the social and aesthetic consequences of mass 
media.‖ Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d. 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006). This Note is skeptical as to whether this 
is Girl Talk‘s actual intent. Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that ―[i]f, on the contrary, the 
commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which the 
alleged infringer merely uses to get attention . . . the claim to fairness in borrowing from another‘s 
work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish).‖ Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 580 (1994); see also Blanch, 467 F.3d. at 252 (noting that merely repurposing another‘s work 
would not be sufficient for a finding of transformative use under current fair use jurisprudence). Thus, 
it is suggested here that Girl Talk is not commenting on the underlying works—instead he is merely 
using the most popular parts of the works to garner attention and ―sell‖ records. 
 243. Mongillo, supra note 6, at 29. 
 244. Id. at 30. However, it does not logically follow that mash-ups as such are deserving of robust 
protection merely because they require recognizable elements to be successful. The Supreme Court has 
explained that protection afforded to parody is in large part due to the fact that parody ―[l]ike less 
ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, . . . can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier 
work . . . . [T]hus . . . like other comment or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107.‖ Acuff-Rose, 
510 U.S. at 579. It follows from this statement that parody is afforded protection under the Copyright 
Act because of the analogy between parody and commentary or criticism, not because a parodic work 
necessarily requires the parodist to use elements of the parodied composition. 
 245. Mongillo, supra note 6, at 31. Although this author suggests that lack of intent to compete 
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creative or innovative these arguments may be, in light of recent 
precedent, it seems unlikely that courts would be willing to interpret Acuff-
Rose so liberally.
246
  
Finally, a number of commentators have suggested that the problem 
can be solved through licensing schemes.
247
 One scheme that has been 
offered by a number of commentators is a compulsory sampling license 
similar to the compulsory license provision in § 115 of the Copyright Act, 
although generally requiring more specificity.
248
 Benefits of such a scheme 
are said to ensure adequate compensation for copyright holders, while 
maintaining economic incentives to create new works and encouraging 
musical innovation via access to source material for samplers.
249
 Critics of 
this approach have identified a number of problems. Some of these 
criticisms include (1) that works will be associated with works that the 
author finds morally objectionable; (2) that the compulsory system would 
put all samples on the same level, thus failing to provide a distinction 
between samples of ―basic underlying instruments‖ and the artist‘s 
―signature sound‖; and (3) that session musicians would be harmed, even 
more so than they are under the current regime.
250
 One commentator 
further suggests that the strength of this plan—reducing exorbitant 
licensing fees—is the exact reason that the recording industry will never 
 
 
with the sampled works and the low probability of competition with the original works from a market 
perspective are reasons why Girl Talk‘s ―sound collages‖ or mashups do not have a negative effect on 
the market for the work, he neglects to acknowledge that sample licensing would of course be 
affected—if Girl Talk can sample for free, so can everybody else. See supra Part I.C (illustrating the 
substantial revenues derived from sample licenses); see also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG 
Recordings, Inc. (Bridgeport II), 585 F.3d 267, 278 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that fair use did not apply 
in part due to loss of revenues from sampling). 
 246. See, e.g., Bridgeport II, 585 F.3d at 278 (concluding that although the use of a sample was 
transformative, the fair use defense was not applicable to a work containing an unlicensed sample 
because the sampled parts were recognizable and revenues from licenses would likely be lost if 
Bridgeport Music was deprived of the right to license the work). 
 247. See supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text (evaluating the voluntary licensing scheme 
proposed by Tracy Reilly). 
 248. Kenneth M. Achenbach, Comment, Grey Area: How Recent Developments in Digital Music 
Production Have Necessitated the Reexamination of Compulsory Licensing for Sample-Based Works, 
6 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 187, 206–21 (2004); Joshua Crum, Comment, The Day the (Digital) Music Died: 
Bridgeport, Sampling Infringement, and a Proposed Middle Ground, 2008 BYU L. REV. 943, 966–69 
(2008); Chris Johnstone, Note, Underground Appeal: A Sample of the Chronic Questions in Copyright 
Law Pertaining to the Transformative Use of Digital Music in a Civil Society, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 
424–32 (2004); Josh Norek, Comment, ―You Can’t Sing Without the Bling”: The Toll of Excessive 
Sample License Fees on Creativity in Hip-Hop Music and the Need for a Compulsory Sound 
Recording Sample License System, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 83, 93–101 (2004); Note, A New Spin on 
Music Sampling: A Case for Fair Pay, 105 HARV. L. REV. 726, 742–43 (1992); see also supra notes 
73–74 (discussing section 115 and the compulsory mechanical license). 
 249. Crum, supra note 248, at 967–69. 
 250. Reilly, supra note 172, at 402–05.  
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embrace such a strategy.
251
 Additionally, while compulsory license 
schemes would appear to resolve some of the economic problems inherent 
in the current method by which artists acquire permission to use samples, 
this method fails to, inter alia, remedy the normative problems associated 
with enhanced protection for media, like music and sound recordings, and 
providing more leniency with regard to appropriation or quotation 
associated with text.
252
 
B. A Better Solution: The Proposed Scheme 
This Note argues that a legislative solution can provide an effective 
means for dealing with sampling appropriately and comprehensively. This 
Note‘s proposed legislative solution to the problem is as follows: 
Copyright Infringement: Sampling as a Fair Use— 
1. This provision applies equally to musical compositions and 
sound recordings; 
2. Sampling shall be an infringing use if the unlicensed use of a 
sample constitutes a sufficiently substantial use of the underlying 
musical composition or sound recording. To determine whether a 
sample is sufficiently substantial to indicate infringement of a 
musical composition and/or sound recording, the following must be 
ascertained: 
 (a) Ownership, Copying, and Originality. The party alleging 
infringement bears the burden of proving that the party owns a valid 
copyright in the allegedly infringed work and that the sampled 
portion of the allegedly infringed work is protectable when 
examined in isolation as it appears in the allegedly infringed work. 
 
 
 251. DEMERS, supra note 217, at 142–43. Demers, commenting on compulsory schemes, explains 
that ―[i]ronically, the strength of this plan is the very reason why it will never be implemented: it 
proposes a statutory rate that would reduce the standard fees for sample licensing considerably. . . . 
[T]his plan probably cannot be integrated into the Copyright Act because it would encounter too much 
resistance from the recording industry.‖ Id.  
 It should be noted that, § 115 of the Copyright Act primarily benefits record companies, providing 
cheaper rates for licensing songs from writers than before § 115 was enacted. Furthermore, record 
companies often contract around the statutory rate by requiring artists to take a discount on controlled 
compositions (compositions the artist composed). PASSMAN, supra note 73, at 223. The same benefit 
would not be present for record companies with regard to a compulsory sampling license because they 
would be losing revenues on sample licenses as Demers suggests. 
 252. See LESSIG, supra note 221, at 54; see also supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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 (b) Substantiality of the Sample. Provided that the sample is 
sufficiently original under section 2(a), the alleged infringing party 
bears the burden of proving that the following factors weigh in its 
favor in order for the sampling to constitute a fair use: 
 (i) the quantitative significance of the sample to the sampled 
work; 
 (ii) the qualitative significance of the sample to the sampled 
work; 
 (iii) the nature, quality, and extent of transformative processes 
used to transform the sample. 
3. Definitions— 
―Sampling‖—sampling is the practice of using a portion of a 
musical work and/or sound recording, which is less than the whole, 
and is used as an element in a new work. 
The scheme encompasses a number of traditional theories from 
copyright law, tailoring them to the concerns at issue in music sampling 
cases. Section 1 is aimed at resolving the question of whether sampling of 
a sound recording and the sampling of the underlying musical composition 
should be treated the same.
253
 Of course, as this section clearly states, it 
applies to both in equal fashion.
254
  
 
 
 253. See supra Part II.B.2 (illustrating the dissonance between the Ninth Circuit and the Sixth 
Circuit holdings where de minimis use doctrine applies in the case of musical compositions but not in 
the case of sound recordings). 
 254. Due to the limited scope of this Note—which only addresses sampling in the music 
industry—the scheme does not address other types of works such as video or visual art. This approach 
is consistent with the architecture of the Copyright Act, which addresses the scope of certain rights in 
particular copyrightable subject matter individually. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2006) (addressing the 
scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (addressing the scope of 
exclusive rights in non-dramatic musical works). However, this Note recognizes this scheme as an 
affirmative defense. As such, it may be more effective to employ this provision as a limitation on 
exclusive rights. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (providing for the fair use limitation on exclusive 
rights generally). In this vein, modifying the scheme to cover all types of copyrightable subject matter, 
including things such as collage in the visual arts, would be a novel approach. For cases involving 
sample-like paradigms in other areas such as the visual arts, see Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d. 244 (2d. 
Cir. 2004) (litigating the use of a photograph in a mixed media work by the famous visual artist Jeff 
Koons); Ringgold v. Black Entm‘t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d. 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (litigation regarding 
the unlicensed use of a reproduction of visual art piece in a television show); Sandoval v. New Line 
Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998) (litigation over the unlicensed use of photographs in a 
motion picture). 
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In order to be infringing, the sample must be sufficiently substantial. 
To determine whether a sample is infringing, the scheme employs a 
burden-shifting framework. The purpose of the burden-shifting framework 
is to provide a means by which the court can dispose of a claim for 
infringement as a result of music sampling on a motion to dismiss or a 
motion for summary judgment.  
Section 2(a) lays out the burden of proof for the plaintiff alleging 
infringement. As with other infringement actions, this provision requires 
that the plaintiff show ―(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying 
of constituent elements of the work that are original.‖255 This provision is 
aimed at clearly requiring that the plaintiff show that the sampled portion 
of the work in isolation satisfies the standards for copyright protection. 
Analysis based on the originality of the sample alone has been embraced 
in music sampling infringement actions.
256
 Under this scheme, originality 
should not be assumed. If the plaintiff fails to allege in its complaint that 
the sample meets the originality requirements, the court could, on a motion 
to dismiss, dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. Furthermore, the court could hold as a matter of law that the 
sampled portion is not sufficiently original to be protected and dispose of 
the case on summary judgment.
257
 
Provided that the plaintiff meets its burden of proof, the burden shifts 
to the defendant to prove the sample is a fair use. Section 2(b) attempts to 
tailor the substantial similarity inquiry required for a finding of 
infringement under Feist to be applicable in determining whether a sample 
is infringing.
258
 Section 2(b) contains a factor test, which is intended to 
provide a balancing framework similar to that used for determining fair 
use in the copyright context
259
 and likelihood of confusion
260
 or dilution
261
 
 
 
 255. Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); see also supra notes 
104–09 and accompanying text. 
 256. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004). Although the court 
looked to the originality of only the sampled portion of the work, the court simply assumed the sample 
met the originality requirements. Id. 
 257. For example, a defendant might argue that the sampled portion of the work is scenes a faire 
and as such is not protectable. See, e.g., Griffin v. J-Records, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1141, 1143 (E.D. 
Wash. 2005) (granting summary judgment for defendants where defendants alleged that seven-note 
melodic sequence was scenes a faire, and thus unprotectable). Alternatively, a defendant could argue 
that the idea expressed in a sampled work is only capable of being expressed in a limited number of 
ways, and as such providing protection for the expression contained in the work would result in a 
―monopolization of the subject idea.‖ 4 NIMMER, supra note 95, § 13.03[B][3]. Under this theory, 
known as merger doctrine, a defendant could present a reasonable argument for summary judgment. 
 258. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 259. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see also supra note 121 and accompanying text (listing the factors 
used to determine fair use). 
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in the trademark context. Factors (i) and (ii) codify the de minimis use 
doctrine, thus resolving the question that arises when comparing 
Bridgeport I and Newton of when and whether the doctrine is applicable to 
musical compositions and sound recordings: under this scheme it applies 
to both.
262
 Similarly, these factors could be seen as a two-part analysis of 
the third fair use factor.
263
 Most importantly, these two factors make 
explicitly clear that courts should evaluate the qualitative and quantitative 
significance of the sample in relation to the plaintiff‘s work—how 
significant the sampled portion is to the defendant‘s work is immaterial.264 
Factor (iii) borrows from the fair use context, making it relevant whether 
the sampler has made some type of transformative and creative alterations 
to the sample rather than simply using the sample verbatim from the 
original source.
265
 The more drastic the transformative process, the more 
likely this factor will weigh in favor of the defendant, and thus the more 
likely the sample will be found to be non-infringing. What is perhaps more 
important about borrowing from fair use is that the scheme does not 
borrow factors regarding the commercial nature of the work and the effect 
on the market for or value of the work.
266
 Most works containing samples 
are commercial works, and as such, neither of these factors is particularly 
helpful in determining where the line should be drawn for samples 
appearing in commercial works.
267
  
 
 
 260. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW 
AND POLICY 506–07, figure 7-1 (3d. ed. 2010) (listing the factor tests for each circuit for likelihood of 
confusion). 
 261. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)–(B) (2006). 
 262. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 263. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006) (―the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole‖); see also supra note 121 and accompanying text (listing the factors 
used to determine fair use). 
 264. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 95, § 13.03[A][2][a]. Nimmer has advocated for this position, 
stating: 
The question in each case is whether the similarity relates to matter that constitutes a 
substantial portion of plaintiff‘s work—not whether such material constitutes a substantial 
portion of defendant‘s work. Thus, for example, the fact that the sampled material is played 
throughout defendants’ song cannot establish liability, if that snippet constitutes an 
insubstantial portion of plaintiff’s composition.  
Id. 
 265. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 266. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1), (4) (2006); see also supra note 121 and accompanying text (quoting the 
text of 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
 267. To be clear, this scheme is not intended to replace the fair use inquiry. In cases where the 
allegedly infringing work, for example, is a parody, as in Acuff-Rose, or a criticism, a traditional fair 
use analysis would likely be more permissive than the scheme being proposed. See supra Part II.B.1 
(discussing the court‘s holding and analysis in Acuff-Rose). 
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The solution presented is aimed at solving a number of problems and 
issues. First, this scheme provides a comprehensive framework for courts 
to analyze sampling problems, solving the issue of what standard to 
apply.
268
 Second, the scheme is prescriptive—it is instructive to samplers 
and their lawyers, providing a framework to analyze works and determine 
whether their use of sampling is infringing, thus requiring a license, or 
non-infringing, which does not.
269
 From an economic standpoint, the 
scheme is intended to explicitly provide that not every unlicensed sample 
constitutes an infringement. As such, the scheme will give samplers more 
leverage in negotiations for licenses, and hopefully make licensing fees 
more reasonable and commensurate with the value of the sample without 
compelling copyright holders to license the sample. Third, artists who are 
already making drastic transformative alterations to small samples will be 
vindicated
270—they are no longer evading the law; they are complying 
with it. 
Legislative implementation of this scheme would provide courts with a 
uniform manner to address sampling cases, in effect remedying 
discrepancies among the circuits.
271
 Of course, while legislative 
implementation might be best, enacting such a scheme can be a time 
consuming and lengthy process. As such, in the alternative, courts could 
implement the proposed scheme as a modified version of the fair use 
defense. Section 107 provides that when determining whether a particular 
use of copyrighted subject matter is a fair one, courts should use the 
factors, which ―include‖ those factors that are listed.272 Section 101 
provides that ―the [term] ‗including‘ . . . [is] illustrative and not 
limitative.‖273 By interpreting § 107 in light of the definition of 
―including‖ in § 101, courts could modify the fair use inquiry as suggested 
in the proposed scheme when determining whether primarily commercial 
works containing unlicensed samples are infringing or non-infringing 
under § 107. 
 
 
 268. As evidenced by the discussion of the cases involving music sampling, the theories upon 
which samplers rely and the courts‘ interpretations of these theories are hardly congruent. See supra 
Part II.B. 
 269. As Nimmer notes, there are a number of myths amongst musicians about what constitutes a 
permissible appropriation. 4 NIMMER, supra note 95, § 13.03[A][2][a]. 
 270. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 271. See, e.g., Part III.A.2 (illustrating the discrepancy between Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit 
cases with regard to application of the de minimis use doctrine). 
 272. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). For the text of § 107, see text accompanying supra note 121. 
 273. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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C. Application: Applying the Proposed Scheme to Prior Litigation 
Maybe the best way to illustrate how the proposed scheme will operate 
is to analyze the scheme as applied to previous litigation. As an example, 
consider Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc.,
274
 which 
contains a clearly infringing sample, but also contains a non-infringing 
one, under the new scheme.
275
 As previously discussed, this case involved 
alleged copyright infringement of the song ―Atomic Dog‖ performed by 
George Clinton,
276
 which was sampled by Public Announcement and 
included in their song ―D.O.G. in Me.‖277 
As a preliminary matter, this litigation did not involve a suit by Capitol 
Records, the owner of the copyright in the sound recording.
278
 However, 
for purposes of illustration, suppose Capitol Records was a party to this 
lawsuit, claiming infringement of its sound recording of ―Atomic Dog.‖ 
As the court notes, the composition and the sound recording are 
identical—this is because the song was spontaneously composed in the 
studio and the sound recording is the fixed expression of the musical 
work.
279
 As such, the analysis as to whether there is infringement of the 
sound recording or the musical work is virtually identical.
280
 
The sample that would be clearly infringing in Bridgeport II under the 
proposed scheme was Public Announcement‘s use of the ―Bow Wow‖ 
refrain.
281
 First, the ―Bow Wow‖ refrain is sufficiently original to warrant 
protection as copyrightable subject matter; thus, the plaintiffs would likely 
meet their burden of proof under § 2(a). Therefore, the defendant would 
have the burden of showing that the sample is not sufficiently substantial 
to constitute infringement. As to factor (i)—quantitative significance to 
the sampled work—the sample is relatively small, only lasting about four 
seconds. However, it is the refrain to the song and is repeated a number of 
times in the allegedly infringed work. As such, this factor would weigh in 
favor of the plaintiffs. Factor (ii)—qualitative significance—similarly 
 
 
 274. 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 275. For a more thorough discussion of this fact pattern and the Sixth Circuit‘s holding in the case, 
see supra notes 162–70. 
 276. GEORGE CLINTON, Atomic Dog, on COMPUTER GAMES (Capitol Records 1982). 
 277. PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, D.O.G. in Me, on ALL WORK, NO PLAY (Universal Records 1998). 
 278. The plaintiffs in this case were Bridgeport Music, Inc. and Southfield Music, Inc., which only 
retained ownership rights in the composition. Bridgeport II, 585 F.3d at 272. 
 279. Bridgeport II, 585 F.3d at 272. 
 280. Of course, this assumes that it has been proven by the plaintiffs that the actual recording was 
sampled. Otherwise, the sample may just be ―replay‖ and thus not infringing of the sound recording. 
See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of replay). 
 281. See supra note 165 (describing the ―Bow Wow‖ refrain). 
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weighs in favor of the plaintiff. The chorus or refrain of a song is 
particularly important to the song—it is often referred to as the hook 
because it hooks the audience into listening to the song. Finally, factor (iii) 
gives weight to any transformative processes that have been used to alter 
the sample. Here, it appears that there was at least some alteration to the 
sample including pitch shifting and some editing.
282
 However, this type of 
alteration, particularly pitch shifting—which in effect is just a 
transposition—is not sufficiently transformative to have factor (iii) weigh 
in defendant‘s favor.283 At best, this factor is neutral. Since the balance of 
the three factors appears to weigh in favor of the plaintiffs, Public 
Announcement‘s sampling of the ―Bow Wow‖ refrain should be found to 
be infringing. 
Alternatively, the ―dog‖ sample used in Public Announcement‘s song 
should not be found to be infringing under the proposed scheme. First, the 
sample is simply George Clinton saying the word ―dog‖ in a low voice. In 
Bridgeport II, the district court found this sample was infringing.
284
 
However, saying the word ―dog‖ in a low voice taken out of context of the 
entire song can hardly be seen as sufficiently original to be afforded 
copyright protection. As such, § 2(a) weighs in favor of the defendants. 
Under § 2(a) of the scheme, lack of sufficient originality to be afforded 
protection should result in dismissal. Nonetheless, factors (i) and 
(ii) weigh in favor of defendants; the sample is less than one second in 
length, only appears two times in ―Atomic Dog,‖ and qualitatively is not a 
prominent or important part of the song. It would be more appropriate to 
characterize the ―dog‖ sample as akin to a drum hit, horn stab, or guitar 
strum, none of which should be found qualitatively or quantitatively 
important to any song or recording once taken out of context. Finally, as to 
factor (iii), the sample appears to be relatively unaltered, and thus, this 
factor weighs in favor of plaintiffs. Since most of the factors weigh in 
favor of the defendants, the sample should be found to be non-infringing 
even if the court finds the sample is sufficiently original to be protectable. 
 
 
 282. See PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, D.O.G. in Me, on ALL WORK, NO PLAY (Universal Records 
1998). At approximately 4:00, the sampled refrain is heard in the song. It is slightly edited and the 
sample is transposed and layered—producing a harmony. 
 283. Of course, more severe editing or more severe alterations to the chorus may have tipped this 
factor in favor of the defendants. 
 284. Bridgeport II, 585 F.3d at 273. 
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CONCLUSION 
Sampling is not new. The practice, as it currently exists, has been 
around since the 1980s, and there are no signs that this it is going away. 
Nor should it. The idea of musical quotation, or borrowing musical ideas, 
has been practiced throughout music history.
285
 Unfortunately, due to 
normative views regarding the value of certain media—particularly music 
and visual media, such as film—and courts‘ robust copyright protection of 
that media, the quotation of such media has been overvalued by copyright 
holders and overprotected by copyright law.
286
 Because little has changed 
since Judge Duffy uttered his famous words ―Thou shalt not steal‖ in 
Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.
287—indeed, 
evidence of the persistence of Judge Duffy‘s attitude toward samplers are 
clearly affirmed by Judge Guy‘s opinion in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films
288—it seems it is time for Congress to remedy the matter. 
In its current state, copyright law appears to be ill-equipped to deal 
with many of the problems and challenges that music sampling presents. 
This may be due in large part to the fact that Congress, when drafting the 
Sound Recording Act of 1971, did not contemplate music sampling.
289
 
Although dissonance occurs between the arguments advanced by this Note 
and Judge Guy‘s opinion for the Ninth Circuit in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films, there is consonance on one point: ―[t]o properly sort out 
[the problems with music sampling] with its complex technical and 
business overtones, one needs the type of investigative resources . . . 
possessed by Congress.‖290 In short, this complex issue would be most 
adequately addressed through congressional action. 
The proposal above does not abandon the vast body of copyright 
jurisprudence in favor a completely different approach. Quite to the 
contrary, it attempts to use the tools articulated in past cases and 
commentary to create legislation that both comports with traditional 
notions and theories of copyright law and adapts them to confront the 
issue of music sampling, which has yet to be adequately and expressly 
 
 
 285. See Jeremy Beck, Music Composition, Sound Recordings, and Digital Sampling in the 21st 
Century: A Legislative and Legal Framework to Balance Competing Interests, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 
1, 23–30 (2005) (describing practices of musical quotation and borrowing and tracing the origins of 
these practices back to classical music). 
 286. LESSIG, supra note 221, at 54. 
 287. 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 288. 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 289. See generally S. Rep. 92-72, supra note 205; H.R. Rep. 92-487, supra note 205. 
 290. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 805. 
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addressed in Title 17. The scheme attempts to strike a better balance, 
allowing samplers to take small samples and creatively alter them without 
fear of impending litigation or excessively high licensing fees for these 
small samples. What the scheme does not do is give samplers an unbridled 
license to sample as much as they want without compensating the writer 
and owner of the sound recording. 
Modifying existing copyright legislation to account for new 
technologies has been done in the past. Congress has time and time again 
made modifications to the copyright statute to accommodate new 
technologies in the recording industry with legislation such as the Sound 
Recording Act of 1971 and the Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings Act of 1995.
291
 This Note highlights, at the very least, that 
similar reforms are needed with regard to music sampling. 
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